





The International Institute for
Justice and the Rule of Law

IIJ CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

Addressing Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism

*A publication under the
IIJ REMVE Initiative*





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The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law

Inspired by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the IJ was established in 2014 as a neutral platform for training and capacity-building for lawmakers, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement, corrections officials, and other justice sector practitioners to share and promote the implementation of good practices and sustainable counter-terrorism approaches founded on the rule of law.

The IJ is an intergovernmental organisation based in Malta with an international Governing Board of Administrators (GBA) representing its 14 members: Algeria, France, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. The IJ is staffed by a dynamic international team headed by an Executive Secretary, who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the IJ.

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Representatives of the following countries, leading international organisations, and other institutions participated in the series of Online Expert Meetings on Countering REMVE. This IJ Practitioner's Guide is primarily informed by material drawn from the participating practitioners' and subject-matter experts' contributions to those expert meetings, which took place by videoconference between October 2020 and March 2021.

Countries

The Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Serbia, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

International Organisations

Council of Europe (COE), Eurojust, Europol, the European Commission (EC), the European Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Administrative Unit, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the University of Oslo Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Foreword

Criminal justice practitioners have a critical role to play in countering the growing transnational threat of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE). From identifying, investigating, disrupting and prosecuting REMVE cells, networks and lone actors, to incarcerating REMVE offenders and expanding pre-trial services, to providing prison rehabilitation programmes, to post-release monitoring, the scope of criminal justice practitioners' responsibilities in this area is wide-ranging.

Over the past twenty years, criminal justice practitioners have gained significant experience in counter-terrorism, primarily in addressing the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as Da'esh), Al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates and branches, along with individuals inspired by their rhetoric. While some of the expertise thus acquired is directly relevant to countering REMVE, there are also significant differences that require new knowledge, approaches, strategies and tools. Most importantly, although both global jihadist and REMVE leaders and propagandists direct or inspire others to commit violence, ISIS and Al-Qa'ida are far more structured, hierarchical organisations. Many of the individuals around the world involved in REMVE incitement, recruitment and radicalisation are loosely connected, mostly in the online space, posing significant challenges for law enforcement in uncovering and dismantling plots and related activity.

To explore how criminal justice practitioners can most effectively tackle the REMVE phenomenon, the IJJ has launched a new initiative, which is being implemented with support from the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, to develop this *IJJ Criminal Justice Practitioner's Guide for Addressing REMVE* (hereafter *IJJ Practitioner's Guide*).

Criminal justice practitioners and policymakers represent the primary audience for this *IJJ Practitioner's Guide*, which focuses on how governments can address REMVE through criminal justice systems. At the same time, civil society and relevant community stakeholders have equally critical roles to play in a comprehensive approach to this challenge, and much of the material that the Guide contains is intended to be useful to relevant civil society and community actors as well as to criminal justice practitioners. In its final section, the Guide directly addresses how law enforcement can engage with communities and improve public awareness of the REMVE's unique features, not only to improve preparedness against attacks but also to help proactively identify individuals undergoing or at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism for preventive intervention.

Methodology

This *IJJ Practitioner's Guide* is primarily informed by material drawn from a series of expert meetings with practitioners from a range of countries, with direct experience addressing REMVE threats through policing and law enforcement, prosecution, prison management, counter-radicalisation, and civil society work, as well as representatives of leading international organisations and other institutions. The IJJ convened these expert meetings by videoconference between October 2020 and March 2021. A full list of the countries and organisations who were represented in these expert meetings can be found in the Acknowledgments section. The participating practitioners' contributions highlighted key themes and issues across different areas of response and various countries, which have shaped the Guide's framework and contents.¹

The *IJJ Practitioner's Guide*, and the research behind it, seeks to address a series of key questions:

- How can we leverage, adapt and/or refine law enforcement experience in countering global jihadist groups to address the REMVE threat?
- How are REMVE actors recruiting, training, communicating, and raising funds, and what opportunities does this offer to law enforcement agencies?
- How should we adapt our existing approaches to account for REMVE's unique features?
- What new tools or authorities, including terrorism legislation, would be valuable for law enforcement actors to counter this threat?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages to using counter-terrorism authorities and tools versus traditional criminal authorities and laws? How do these authorities complement each other?
- What law enforcement-focused initiatives have countries undertaken – either historically or more recently – to address the REMVE threat?
- Which of these initiatives have proven successful and why?
- Could successful initiatives be replicated or adapted for use in other countries and locales?
- What can multilateral organisations bring to the fight against REMVE challenges?

¹ The research approach is thus deliberately based on practitioners' "experienced" input and first-hand operational knowledge, enhanced with desk research which is referenced in footnotes throughout. See Warnes, R, (2009) "Grounded Theory", Chapter 10 in Ling, T, and Villalba van Dijk, L (eds.) *Performance Audit Handbook: Routes to effective evaluation*. Santa Monica CA: RAND, pp. 76-82. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR788.html

Good Practices for Countering Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE)

Below is a unified list of Good Practices for how policymakers and practitioners can address REMVE threats effectively and in compliance with the rule of law. These Good Practices are based on various countries' historical and ongoing experiences responding to REMVE threats, and are explored in detail in the second Part of the *IJ Practitioner's Guide*. These Good Practices also draw on the GCTF framework documents, which provide expert guidance for criminal justice practitioners in a wide array of counter-terrorism-related areas.²

A. Understanding of Recent REMVE Trends

1. Develop an understanding of how the REMVE threat is unique and differs from other types of violent extremist threats.
2. Establish programmes or processes to educate practitioners on the clear difference between violence or other criminal activity and conduct protected under domestic and international law, including the exercise of human rights such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association.
3. Conduct thorough assessments at the national level of what criminal justice tools used against ISIS and Al-Qa'ida over the past twenty years would be effective in addressing REMVE, how those tools should be adapted, and what types of new authorities, tools and approaches are needed.
4. Closely track and share information about REMVE propaganda, particularly on which manifestos and other material are serving as inspiration for REMVE groups and actors around the world, for sharing among relevant government agencies, transnationally through bilateral and multilateral channels, and with the public (including the private sector) as appropriate.
5. Closely monitor information about REMVE actors' new and emerging tactics and techniques which could be used in "copycat" attacks, for sharing as appropriate.

B. Legislation and Regulation

6. Ensure the availability of appropriate legislation criminalising violence or plotting of violence by REMVE actors, clearly applicable both to organised groups and to lone actors, regardless of whether such activity has an international dimension or is purely domestic.
7. Proscribe or designate as terrorist REMVE groups, so as to criminalise individuals' organisational and supporting activities, to the extent permitted by domestic and international law, including human rights law.
8. Take advantage of financial sanctions that have been used against other types of terrorist groups to counter REMVE groups, and devote resources to better understand such groups' financing.

² See "Framework Documents of the Global Counterterrorism Forum," <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents>.

C. Investigation and Disruption

9. Clarify the jurisdictional roles of government agencies in order to ensure a coordinated response to REMVE.
 10. Establish both: a) multi-agency investigative task forces with a continuing focus on REMVE threats that leverage the strengths and capabilities of various law enforcement agencies, including prosecution as well as investigative authorities; and b) appropriate processes to coordinate among investigators at the national and local levels, based on a culture of partnership and sharing of knowledge and expertise.
 11. Ensure that law enforcement agencies devote organisational focus and resources commensurate to the increasing REMVE threat, including personnel and equipment in addition to financing.
 12. Build risk assessment tools to help identify individuals' vulnerability to REMVE radicalisation and violence. Such tools should both: a) leverage existing tools (in light of similarities in risk factors and radicalisation processes across different forms of violent extremism); and b) reflect features peculiar to REMVE ideology and dynamics.
 13. Intervene pre-emptively to overtly warn REMVE actors of potential legal consequences, based on careful consideration of the costs and benefits of pre-emptive action as opposed to continued covert investigation.
 14. Develop approaches for analysing REMVE actors at a network level, rather than focusing exclusively on individuals or organised groups, given the complex, fluid nature of REMVE dynamics.
 15. Develop system to track and counter potential "insider threat" of violent extremists operating within the ranks of the police or military forces, or in other positions of public trust.
 16. Invest significant investigative resources in monitoring and analysing REMVE actors' online activity, and build close relations with internet platforms and providers to obtain information on and counter those actors' exploitation of the online environment, in accordance with freedom of expression and privacy rights.
 17. When consistent with domestic and international law, including human rights law, and based on careful consideration of the costs and benefits, provide information to internet platforms and providers so that they can make informed decisions about enforcing their terms of service through the voluntary removal of hateful content, and when necessary the blocking of REMVE actors from accessing particular platforms.
 18. Establish bilateral and multilateral channels for regular communication and coordination in countering potentially transnational REMVE threats, including the establishment of joint investigative teams and sharing of intelligence or evidence as appropriate.
 19. Share information transnationally to enable close monitoring of REMVE actors' travel to active conflict zones, for criminal justice or other action as consistent with domestic legislation.
 20. Collect and produce timely counter-terrorist intelligence on REMVE actors and networks, exploiting open-source intelligence as well as covertly obtained forms, and using fusion centres as needed, while ensuring appropriate coordination between law enforcement agencies and intelligence services.
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D. Prosecution

21. Prosecute REMVE offenders on the most serious readily provable charges available, taking advantage as necessary of non-terrorism-related criminal statutes, such as for weapons violations or hate crimes.
22. Use language of appropriate gravity to characterise REMVE offenders' conduct, regardless of the chargeable offence, in order to communicate condemnation of such violent extremism to a public audience.
23. Establish sentencing guidelines for courts, whether mandatory or discretionary, which apply to REMVE violence or plotting of violence and reflect the gravity of those offences.

E. Prison Rehabilitation and Post-Release Monitoring

24. Devote the appropriate level of resources to monitor REMVE offenders' in-prison activity, including potential recruitment activities or active escape or attack planning, that corresponds with the terrorist, rather than "ordinary" criminal, nature of their offences.
25. Institute in-prison de-radicalisation programmes for REMVE offenders that leverage existing tools, designed and based on different forms of violent extremism, while adapting them to account for REMVE's particular ideology and dynamics.
26. Educate prison staff on the features unique to REMVE and the significant level of threat it may pose, and train them to identify indicators of radicalisation to violence and respond appropriately.
27. Conduct pre-release risk assessments of REMVE offenders, and institute effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.
28. Institute post-release monitoring or other administrative post-custodial tools as appropriate, in accordance with domestic and international law, including human rights law.

F. Community Engagement and Public Outreach

29. Establish routine and incident-specific information sharing between law enforcement and the public (including the private sector) on REMVE trends, threats, and tactics, to include information on risk assessment, suspicious behaviour reporting, insider threats, and other security awareness and preparedness topics.
 30. Put mechanisms in place allowing civil society professionals or other community actors to refer individuals undergoing or at risk of REMVE radicalisation to government agencies for proactive action by the appropriate public health, social services, and law enforcement entities.
 31. Establish multi-disciplinary case management teams when appropriate, equipped with tools to assess individuals' levels of risk and tailor intervention strategies, involving not only criminal justice practitioners but also psychologists and mental health professionals, child protection or youth care specialists, social services, and school staff, depending on the circumstances.
 32. Devote significant resources to improving public awareness of the features unique to REMVE and the significant level of threat it may pose, through online as well as off-line programmes, while also publicising relevant tools and approaches developed to combat the range of terrorist threats. Such efforts should equip community members to help identify and counter radicalisation and recruitment at the local level, while communicating clear moral condemnation of racially or ethnically motivated violence.
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Part I – OVERVIEW OF THE REMVE THREAT

Part I of this IJJ Practitioner’s Guide aims to give the reader a brief overview of the REMVE threat itself. The first section lays out the basic definitional elements that REMVE encompasses, independent of the precise definition or term that may be used by a particular government or organisation. The next section offers a very brief historical overview of REMVE and lists several core features that differentiate current forms of REMVE from previous manifestations, or from other types of violent extremist threats. The final section highlights how the overall threat of REMVE attacks is increasing, and is transnational in multiple ways.

A. Definition of REMVE

This *IJJ Practitioner’s Guide* uses the term “Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism.” The phrase is used in the United States to define “the threat that encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others, including a given population group.”³ Other governments, including the United Kingdom, use terms such as “right-wing terrorism”, “far-right terrorism”, “extreme-right terrorism”, “violent right-wing extremism” and “white supremacist terrorism” to describe violence or plotting of violence perpetrated by individuals or groups who promote or conduct violence in the name of defending against perceived threats to their racial or ethnic identity. This includes violence or plotting targeting immigrants, Jewish, Muslim, racial or other ethnic minority groups, LGBTQI+ individuals, governments, and other perceived enemies.

Semantics aside, these terms are all being used to describe essentially the same phenomenon, which can include elements of cultural nationalism, white nationalism and white supremacy. A recent United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN CTED) publication provides another useful reference point: ‘Experts have identified extreme right-wing terrorism – also referred to as far-right or racially and ethnically motivated terrorism – as a unique form of political violence with often fluid boundaries between hate crime and organised terrorism. It is a not a coherent or easily defined movement, but rather a shifting, complex and overlapping milieu of individuals, groups and movements (online and offline) espousing different but related ideologies, often linked by hatred and racism toward minorities, xenophobia, Islamophobia or anti-Semitism.’⁴

³ Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Domestic Violent Extremists Emboldened in Aftermath of Capitol Breach, Elevated Domestic Terrorism Threat of Violence Likely Amid Political Transitions and Beyond,” January 13, 2021. <https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-FBI-NCTC-CapitolBreachViolence.pdf>.

⁴ UN, “Member States concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism”, CTED Trends Alert, April 2020. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism.pdf

B. Historical Perspective

Adherents to racially or ethnically motivated movements and associated violence have a long history in Europe, North and South America, and other regions of the world, in some cases dating back centuries. They arguably reached a peak with the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships and similarly motivated movements in Europe between the 1920s and 1940s.⁵ Since that time, while the influence of such movements in various countries has risen and fallen, there has been a continuing level of violence associated with REMVE actors. Over the years, REMVE attacks have at times resulted in major terrorist incidents, along with both random and planned violence against minorities and representatives of the state, such as police officers and government officials.⁶

A number of unique features differentiate the current REMVE threat from previous manifestations, or from other types of violent extremist threats, among them:

Blended Ideologies: A blend of ideologies, some idiosyncratic and esoteric, including conspiracy theories related to “cult-like” behaviour, across a spectrum of extremism.⁷

Fluid Group Dynamics: The increasing evolution of non-hierarchical and constantly morphing networks, rather than structured hierarchical organisations.⁸

Changing Demographics: A shift from traditional violent extremist groups, with older membership, to groups with younger members who are both more extreme and more active.⁹

Lone Actor Threats: Most recent attacks conducted by lone actors, often inspired by, associated with, or affiliated with other REMVE individuals or networks online.¹⁰

Increasing Possession and Use of Weapons: An increasing level of planned or perpetuated violence, associated with the possession and use of weapons and an intent to maximise casualties.¹¹

These features which make current REMVE threats particularly challenging, and which criminal justice actors must understand in order to more effectively counter such threats, are explored in more detail by Good Practice 1 in the second part of the *IJ Practitioner's Guide*.

⁵ Rogger, H & Weber, E. (1974) *The European Right: A historical profile*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Laqueur, W. ed. (1979) *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*. London: Pelican.

⁶ See the Appendix for some particularly notable examples of both more recent and historical REMVE attacks.

⁷ Carter, E. 'Right Wing Extremism/Radicalism: Reconstructing the concept'. *Journal of political Ideologies* 23 (2) 2018, pp. 157-182. Available at <https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/2221/1/JP1%20Revised%20Final.pdf>

⁸ Koehler, D. 'Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current developments and issues for the future', *PRISM* Vol. 6 No.2 (2016) pp. 84-105. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26470450.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9d60c8d48fc212afe71485b047dda44b>

⁹ Poulter, J, 'The Left Behind: What makes young people join the far right?', BBC <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/73eb2bab-ca72-42eb-a712-26f0680010bb>

¹⁰ Bouhana, N. et. al. 'Background and Preparatory Behaviours of Right-Wing Extremist Lone Actors: A comparative study', *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol. 12 Issue. 6. <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/a10-bouhana-et-al.pdf>

¹¹ Mekhennet, S, 'Interpol Official warns of dramatic rise in extremist right-wing violence', *Washington Post* 25 Feb 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interpol-official-warns-of-dramatic-rise-in-extremist-right-wing-violence/2020/02/24/174a8394-5725-11ea-9b35-def5a027d470_story.html

C. Current Outlook: Growing, Increasingly Transnational Threat

In recent years, the number of REMVE attacks has surged in certain countries¹², even becoming the primary source of terrorist plots and attacks.¹³ Some particularly notable examples of both more recent and historical REMVE attacks are included in the Appendix. They illustrate the broad range of types of attacks, which have used various methodologies — including firearms, “home-made” improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ramming vehicles, and “cold weapons” such as knives — to target a variety of intended victims, sites, and institutions. This highlights the difficulty for criminal justice practitioners in identifying, disrupting, and arresting REMVE actors,¹⁴ arguably magnified in the case of attacks planned and executed by lone actors not directly connected with structured organisations or groups.

Due to a combination of the factors noted in Section A — and as illustrated by the examples in the Appendix — the overall threat of REMVE attacks is increasing. For the United States, for example, 2019 was the most lethal year of domestic terrorist attacks since 1995, the year of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, with REMVE actors responsible for four of the year’s five lethal attacks. These attacks, primarily conducted by lone actors using firearms, led to 24 deaths. There has also been an upsurge of threat in the United Kingdom. While around ten per cent of the national Counter Terrorist Policing caseload is currently focused on REMVE, nearly a third of the terrorist plots disrupted in the United Kingdom in recent years were the work of the extreme right — a data point which may indicate that REMVE actors have begun moving more frequently or more quickly from radicalisation to attack planning. Even in countries such as the Netherlands, where the government still considers jihadism the main terrorist threat, there is a growing focus on the extreme right, and the current assessment is that attacks by REMVE terrorists are conceivable. Dutch police investigations have identified increasing online threats of attack, as well as more REMVE actors who possess or have access to weapons.

“Although many countries traditionally considered REMVE a form of ‘domestic terrorism’, it will become increasingly important to recognise these transnational dimensions in order to counter it effectively”

It is also important to note that this escalating threat is transnational in multiple ways. REMVE groups’ exploitation of the online space has extended their reach, influence and contacts globally. The rapid spread of hateful propaganda across borders can be difficult to detect and disrupt. Individual actors increasingly mimic methodologies and draw inspiration from REMVE attacks occurring outside their own countries, with certain attackers such as Timothy McVeigh, Anders Breivik, Dylan Roof and Brenton Tarrant taking on iconic status within the violent extremist milieu, and others posting their own pre-attack “manifestos” with similar aspirations. REMVE actors have even travelled transnationally, raising concerns that they will use operational skills and experience acquired abroad to commit attacks at home. Although many countries traditionally considered REMVE a form of “domestic terrorism”, it will become increasingly important to recognise these transnational dimensions in order to counter it effectively.

¹² Vision of Humanity/ Global Terrorism Index, ‘Far Right Attacks in the West surge by 320 per cent’, 2019 GTI. <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/far-right-attacks-in-the-west-surge-by-320-per-cent/>

¹³ Beckett, L. ‘White supremacists behind majority of US domestic terror attacks in 2020’, The Guardian 22 Oct 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/22/white-supremacists-rightwing-domestic-terror-2020>

¹⁴ Ravndal, J., Bjorgo, T. et. al. ‘Right Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 1990 – 2019’, RTV Trend Report No. 1. 2020. https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/groups/rtv-dataset/rtv_trend_report_2020.pdf

Part II – PRACTICAL TOOLS TO COUNTER REMVE

Part II of this IJJ Practitioner's Guide aims to give policymakers and practitioners a better understanding of the tools at their disposal to counter REMVE. Each section of Part II will examine distinct ways in which various countries have responded to REMVE threats. Based on these historical and ongoing experiences, each section will articulate several Good Practices for how policymakers and practitioners can address such threats effectively and in compliance with the rule of law.

The Good Practices address the following: practitioners' overall understanding of recent REMVE trends; relevant legislation and regulation; law enforcement investigation and disruption of this type of terrorist threat; criminal prosecution of the ensuing cases; prison rehabilitation and post-release monitoring of offenders; and community engagement and public outreach related to REMVE.

A. Understanding of Recent REMVE Trends

1. Develop an understanding of how the REMVE threat is unique and differs from other types of violent extremist threats.

2. Establish programmes or processes to educate practitioners on the clear difference between violence or other criminal activity and conduct protected under domestic and international law, including the exercise of human rights such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association.

3. Conduct thorough assessments at the national level of what criminal justice tools used against ISIS and Al-Qa'ida over the past twenty years would be effective in addressing REMVE, how those tools should be adapted, and what types of new authorities, tools and approaches are needed.

As already noted, a number of unique features differentiate the current REMVE threat from previous manifestations of REMVE, and/or from other types of violent extremist threats such as jihadist groups like ISIS (Da'esh), Al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates and branches, in ways that pose particular challenges for criminal justice actors. Developing an understanding of how the REMVE threat is unique and differs from other types of violent extremist threats can best prepare practitioners and policymakers to fashion more effective criminal justice responses.

An improved understanding of REMVE can also better prepare practitioners to identify and counter particular attacks, threats, or activity when they do occur, so it is important not just for specialised counter-terrorism practitioners but for investigators and prosecutors generally to develop a better understanding of REMVE.¹⁵ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training centres for personnel from various government agencies, with curricula based on and revised according to the most up-to-date research, represent one model for improving practitioners' ability to spot and react to violent extremism of various forms.¹⁶

One feature which can make effectively and lawfully countering REMVE particularly challenging is the tendency for REMVE groups or individual actors operating domestically to test and exploit the line between violence or other criminal activity and conduct protected under domestic and international law. There is a corresponding risk that government responses to REMVE could impinge upon constitutional and international human rights such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. Programmes or processes to improve practitioners' understanding of REMVE should thus ensure practitioners are educated on the clear difference between violence or other criminal activity and protected conduct.

While this Guide offers Good Practices for how policymakers and practitioners in various countries can address REMVE threats effectively and in compliance with the rule of law, governments should also consider conducting thorough assessments at the national level of what criminal justice tools used against ISIS and Al-Qa'ida over the past twenty years would be effective in addressing REMVE, how those tools should be adapted, and what types of new authorities, tools and approaches are needed.

Practitioners should improve their familiarity with the following features that distinguish: a) REMVE actors; b) attacks; and c) radicalisation and recruitment dynamics.

Actors

Blended Ideologies

The profusion of terms used to refer to REMVE or to functionally similar forms of violent extremism reflects the difficulty of identifying and pinning down the ideologies of actors who fall into this category. In contrast to the relatively clear ideologies animating jihadist groups such as ISIS (Da'esh) or Al-Qa'ida, REMVE actors are motivated by idiosyncratic blends of extreme viewpoints drawn from a broad ideological spectrum. Individuals, less beholden to hierarchical authority structures, often adopt "tool-shed" ideologies, "home-made" composites of various extremist strands and grievances including conspiracy theories.¹⁷ Collectively, REMVE actors are developing a *lingua franca* of esoteric worldviews, based around such concepts as white supremacism, accelerationism¹⁸, the "Great Replacement" conspiracy theory¹⁹, and eco-fascism²⁰.

¹⁵ In some cases — such as the 2009-2010 REMVE shootings in Malmö, Sweden, which are described in the Appendix — a failure to recognise attackers' racial or ethnic motivations can make it more difficult to successfully investigate and prosecute these crimes.

¹⁶ See Koehler, D., and Fiebig, V., 'Knowing What to Do: Academic and Practitioner Understanding of How to Counter Violent Radicalization,' *Perspectives on Terrorism*, June 2019.

¹⁷ These blended ideologies are sometimes referred to as "pick and mix," or MUU (Mixed, Unclear, and Unstable).

¹⁸ Beauchamp, Z, 'Accelerationism: The obscure idea inspiring white supremacist killers around the World', *Vox* 18 Nov 2019. <https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/11/11/20882005/accelerationism-white-supremacy-christchurch>

¹⁹ CEP, 'The Great Replacement Theory', Undated, Counter Extremism Project. <https://www.counterextremism.com/content/great-replacement-theory>

²⁰ Byman, D, 'Riots, White Supremacy and Accelerationism', *Brookings* 2 Jun 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/02/riots-white-supremacy-and-accelerationism/>


The ad hoc, improvisational nature of some REMVE ideologies can help adherents rationalise collaboration with violent extremists of different stripes. Some REMVE actors have indeed interacted with elements from the extreme left-wing and jihadist networks, both offline and online. One example of this tendency is the case of Michael Solomon and Benjamin Teeter, two alleged self-described Boogaloo Bois.²¹ As alleged, Solomon and Teeter sought to conspire with an individual they believed to be a member of Hamas in the summer of 2020. They expressed a desire to hire themselves out to Hamas as “mercenaries” and their ideas for domestic attacks, including destroying government monuments, and provided parts for firearms they believed would be used in attacks overseas. Following arrest, Teeter pleaded guilty to providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organisation, while Solomon is awaiting trial on the same charge, as well as conspiracy and firearms-related charges. This case illustrates how authorities can use existing legislative frameworks in new ways to counter the transnational threat emerging from domestic terrorism.

These blended ideological motivations can produce barriers to criminal justice practitioners seeking to disrupt REMVE networks and actors.²² For instance, in trials involving groups that do not fit more recognisable violent extremist concepts, it may prove more difficult to demonstrate REMVE “intent” to judges or juries.

Fluid Group Dynamics

Recent years have seen a shift from more traditional hierarchically structured REMVE groups to increasingly fluid heterogenous networks of individuals and groups, often connected online, particularly by social media. In the United Kingdom, for instance, as recently as six or seven years ago there was a predominance of extreme right-wing groups such as the neo-Nazi National Action (NA) organised and operating through in-person connections, but there has since been a shift into the less structured online space. Sweden has also seen smaller radical networks breaking away from larger groups, providing examples of “leaderless resistance.”²³ In Australia, REMVE groups change shape quickly, often morphing into multiple groups due to differing personalities, ideologies and objectives, with group allegiances shifting rapidly. Leading REMVE expert Daniel Koehler

“While today’s REMVE networks are more fluid, temporary, informal, and less hierarchical than earlier groups, they can still form strong relationships and mobilise individuals to violence”



has used the term “hive terrorism” to conceptualise this dynamic whereby “individuals with no previous ties to extremist groups and networks either come to participate in terrorist plots together with long-term movement members or decide to use serious forms of violence...on their own.”²⁴ While today’s REMVE networks are more fluid, temporary, informal, and less hierarchical than earlier groups, they can still form strong relationships and mobilise individuals to violence.

²¹ Mooney, M. ‘The Boogaloo Bois Prepare for Civil War’, The Atlantic 15 Jan 2021. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/01/boogaloo-prepare-civil-war/617683/>

²² Lee, B, ‘Overview of the Far Right’, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Lancaster University, Undated. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/834424/Ben_Lee_-_Overview_of_the_far_right.pdf

²³ Finnsio, M. (2020) ‘Sweden’, in CEP, *Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism-Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures*. Counter Extremism Project Nov 2020. Berlin, p.208. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Study_Violent%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism_Nov%202020.pdf.

²⁴ Koehler, D., ‘Recent Trends in German Right-Wing Violence and Terrorism: What are the Contextual Factors behind ‘Hive Terrorism’? Perspectives on Terrorism, December 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26544644?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.


Changing Demographics

The past decade has also seen a demographic shift, with today's REMVE groups composed of younger members than their analogues from previous years.²⁵ Groups have deliberately focused on recruitment of younger, often technologically savvy activists in universities and elsewhere. Such recruitment increases the risk that adolescents and vulnerable individuals, including those with mental health issues, might be exploited.²⁶ Moreover, a number of REMVE lone actor attackers have been incels, another potential driver of radicalisation to violence.²⁷ Taken together, these dynamics present real challenges for law enforcement both in identifying such recruitment at an early stage and in determining how to intervene appropriately and effectively.²⁸

Relation to Democratic Political Processes

Shadowy REMVE groups and networks often stand in an unclear relation to established organisations that are integrated into political processes, which can pose major challenges for criminal justice response. In the first place, this ambiguity reflects the blurry boundaries of REMVE ideology already discussed, and can make it difficult to determine the point in domestic law where free speech from a political group (or individual) clears the threshold of criminality by encouraging intimidation or violence, and qualifies as a hate crime or incitement to terrorism. Moreover, it can facilitate radicalisation and recruitment. REMVE groups can use the membership of mainstream political organisations as recruitment pools in seeking individuals who are receptive to more extremist ideas and to the use of violence. They can also exploit the sometimes fine line between political speech and incitement to violence, testing the limits of permissible discourse while claiming that they are being persecuted to strengthen an "in group vs. out group" dynamic which fuels radicalisation.

"Shadowy REMVE groups and networks often stand in an unclear relation to established organisations that are integrated into political processes, which can pose major challenges for criminal justice response"



Drawing the appropriate line is particularly challenging for policymakers and criminal justice practitioners in a more permissive political climate, which can also make extremists feel "safer" to express ideas which they believe are less distant from mainstream discourse.²⁹ Practitioners from various countries have attributed some part of the recent upsurge in REMVE activity in the United States and Europe to the rise of populism among mainstream political parties.

One exemplar of the relationship between REMVE and mainstream political processes is the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), a National Socialist movement with branches in Sweden, Norway and Finland.³⁰ The NRM calls for a Pan-Nordic right-wing state, and has threatened the use of violence and engaged in both

²⁵ De Simone, D. 'How Neo-Nazi group National Action targeted young people', BBC News 21 Mar 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48279225>. The "Skinhead" movement of the 1990s represents one exception to this general trend.

²⁶ See for example Dearden, L. 'Teenage neo-Nazi obsessed with mass shootings jailed for preparing acts of terrorism', Independent 6 Nov 2020. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/neo-nazis-uk-rugby-teenager-paul-dunleavy-feuerkrieg-division-jailed-b1647248.html>

²⁷ Van Brunt, B. & Taylor, C. (2021) *Understanding and Treating Incels*. London: Routledge.

²⁸ See for example Badshah, N. 'Teenage Satanist and far right extremist sentenced for terrorism offences', The Guardian 2 Nov 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/nov/02/teenage-satanist-and-far-right-extremist-sentenced-for-terrorism-offences>

²⁹ Ong, K. and Pantucci, R. 'From Fringe to Mainstream: The extreme right wing in Europe', Atlantic Files 1 Jul 2020, Observer Research Foundation: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/fringe-mainstream-extreme-rightwing-europe-68848/>

³⁰ Bjorgo, T. and Ravndal, J. 'What is the Problem with the Nordic Resistance Movement?' Right Now! 7 Jun 2018. University of Oslo C-Rex Centre for Research on Extremism. <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2018/the-nordic-resistance-movement.html?vrtx=tags>

physical and online intimidation of political opponents, while also engaging with the democratic system and seeking to advance its agenda electorally.³¹

Gender Dynamics and the Role of Women

Another factor for criminal justice practitioners to consider is the role of women within REMVE networks.³² There has long been a strong element of misogyny among the memberships of many extreme right-wing groups, as well as in the very ideologies they espouse, and women have mainly represented a passive minority in such groups, fulfilling background coordination and administrative roles.

Recently, however, women are increasingly taking more active leadership roles and acting as spokespersons for REMVE groups.³³ In the United States, a number of female REMVE actors have been prosecuted, and there have been many examples of women involved in violent extremist groups more generally, such as violent environmental groups. Women have taken active roles in REMVE violence in Germany, are subjects of interest in REMVE networks in the United Kingdom, and in the Netherlands and other European countries are involved in anti-government activism and right-wing political activity. Although women are still a minority within REMVE networks, their roles and involvement should not be overlooked.³⁴

Radicalisation and Recruitment

Exploitation of Individual Vulnerabilities

REMVE groups and networks often deliberately target vulnerable individuals for recruitment, including adolescents and those with mental health issues. Such recruitment sometimes takes place in-person, but can be particularly effective when REMVE actors exploit the permissive online environment, which allows them to cast a wider net in seeking individuals who may be drawn to their ideologies.

Although some individuals' motivations to use violence stem from ideology itself, experts have observed that younger REMVE suspects often have similar vulnerabilities to young jihadist extremists, with underlying violent tendencies which extremist groups can manipulate to their own ends. Some are known to the police for acts of violence and delinquency prior to their REMVE involvement. Such "angry young men" seeking adventure, excitement, and a sense of belonging may have little regard for the content of the ideology that can enable them to express their urges. In Germany, for instance, there have been examples of individuals from the extreme left-wing turning to violent jihadism, and one of Italy's first "foreign terrorist fighters" had been an activist in the extreme right-wing before seeking to join a jihadist group overseas.

³¹ On the one hand, the fact that the organisation has been banned in Finland in 2019, but still operates legally in the other Scandinavian countries, reflects the difficulty of pinning down some groups' motivations, as well as the NRM's success in restraining its use of violence below legal thresholds. At the same time, many NRM activists train in street fighting and have previous criminal records, providing a clearly identified recruitment pool for even more extreme REMVE actors. Indeed, three former NRM members carried out the Gothenburg attacks detailed earlier, and the catalyst for the organisation's proscription in Finland was a Finnish NRM activist's 2016 racially aggravated assault, which resulted in the victim's later death and the proscription of the NRM in Finland the following year. Some NRM members have broken away to form the Nordic Force, a smaller and more extreme underground REMVE group. See Ravndal, J. *Right-Wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A comparative case study*. Undated, University of Oslo. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/64981/Ravndal_with+title+page.pdf?sequence=2

³² Campion, K. *Women in the Extreme and Radical Right: Forms of participation and their implications*, Social Sciences Vol.9, Issue 9, August 2020. <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/9/149/htm>

³³ Sigl, J. *Female right-wing dropouts and meanings of violence*, Civitas-Review of Social Sciences, Vol.16, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2016. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1519-60892016000100006


³⁴ Sterkenburg, N. *Far-Right Extremism: A practical introduction*, Dec 2019. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ran_fre_factbook_20191205_en.pdf

Online Radicalisation and Recruitment

A major enabler and driver of the threat posed by REMVE actors is their exploitation of the internet for communication, radicalisation, recruitment, networking, planning, and coordination.³⁵

Online, individuals already radicalised by REMVE ideology have access to a global community and an expansive audience of other extreme right-wing and REMVE actors. Spending time inside “filter bubbles” of hateful content, they can find material that deepens the extremism of their own beliefs, engage with like-minded individuals without the interference of national borders or geographic distances, and radicalise others who may be sympathetic. Individuals and groups alike actively conduct recruitment online — including through video games³⁶ — for membership in REMVE networks and for participation in related plots and attacks.

“Experts have observed that younger REMVE suspects often have similar vulnerabilities to young jihadist extremists, with underlying violent tendencies which extremist groups can manipulate to their own ends”



Increasingly, REMVE actors are using fringe platforms and those associated with gaming where groups congregate online. Young and potentially vulnerable individuals can be very exposed to manipulative influences in the gaming environment. It is a challenge for law enforcement to understand the aspects and characteristics of various platforms and anonymous forums, and this often poses a significant problem in identifying criminal actions amidst a mass of background activity.

Regulation of the online space is difficult, often ineffective, and complicated in legal terms when it risks impinging upon human rights like the freedom of expression.³⁷ As REMVE groups have become more security conscious, many have taken advantage by splitting their communications into two streams: memes and “softer” propaganda which they broadcast on more mainstream public platforms, separate from more violent propaganda and attack plans which are shared in the closed groups. The most extreme elements typically use encrypted messaging apps.

The COVID-19 global health pandemic has exemplified and accelerated many of these developments. Extremist actors have exploited the pandemic, using the internet to start or amplify conspiracy theories, including anti-government messages and theories promoting fear regarding 5G technologies and vaccinations, through which REMVE-related narratives have influenced a broad mainstream audience.³⁸ An environment in which individuals worldwide are spending increased time online due to enforced quarantines and local lockdowns, while growing more distant from support networks and more vulnerable to manipulation, may prove ripe for recruitment.

³⁵ UN CTED (2020) *Op. Cit.*; Gaudette, T. et. al., *The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from former Right Wing Extremists*, Terrorism and Political Violence 16 Jul 2020. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2020.1784147?journalCode=ftpv20>

³⁶ “Inside the Call of Duty games hosted by British far-right group to ‘recruit young people’ into twisted white nationalism,” The Sun (UK), 16 February 2021, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/13986628/call-duty-warzone-far-right-patriotic-alternative-mark-collett/>.

³⁷ This is a particular problem in the United States, where all advocacy that falls short of incitement to imminent lawless action is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. incitement to imminent lawless action. See *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, (1969).

³⁸ Crawford, B, *Coronavirus and Conspiracies: How the far right is exploiting the pandemic*. Kings College London, 16 Sep 2020. <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/coronavirus-and-conspiracies-how-the-far-right-is-exploiting-the-pandemic>

Radicalisation and Recruitment in Prisons

REMVE groups, like violent jihadist groups, have found prisons to be a unique environment for radicalisation and recruitment.³⁹ The United Kingdom currently has a record number of far-right prisoners in detention for TACT-connected offences,⁴⁰ and there are growing concerns at the level of extreme right radicalisation within prison systems more broadly. Extreme right-wing prisoners, like other violent extremists within the prison system, can be influential over the views and behaviour of other inmates. These include active recruitment and both non-violent and violent resistance to prison authorities. More generally, individuals in prison can be particularly vulnerable, in search of a sense of meaning, as well as the physical security, that group identities can provide.⁴¹ Historically, groups like the Aryan Brotherhood in the United States have exploited those vulnerabilities.⁴²

“A major enabler and driver of the threat posed by REMVE actors is their exploitation of the internet for communication, radicalisation, recruitment, networking, planning, and coordination...The COVID-19 pandemic has exemplified and accelerated many of these developments”

Attacks

Lone Actor Threats

Related to the increasing fluidity of group dynamics is an increasing threat of individuals carrying out attacks outside the framework of group activity. In Europe, where REMVE violence was previously associated with extreme right groups or with gangs such as the “Skinheads” in the 1990s, the main perpetrators of REMVE attacks in the past decade have been lone actors, harder for the authorities to find and identify. The same holds true in the U.S., where REMVE groups now appear and disappear regularly, changing their names and shape-shifting, while the same key individual actors keep regularly re-appearing. The current FBI profile of the greatest domestic terrorist threat is a self-radicalised lone attacker, without any formal link to an organised group, attacking a soft target with firearms. Even for many individuals loosely linked to REMVE groups, it is a “perceived” affiliation, based more on their knowledge of group ideology and subjective feelings of belonging, rather than any formal membership, that drives their actions. Such lone actor attacks pose serious difficulties for practitioners to identify, disrupt, and counter.

“The main perpetrators of REMVE attacks in the past decade have been lone actors, harder for the authorities to find and identify”

³⁹ Hannah, G. Clutterbuck, L. and Rubin, J. (2008) *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR571.html

⁴⁰ Sabbagh, D. 'Numbers of far-right terrorist prisoners in Britain hits record high | The far right | The Guardian. This is directly linked to the proscription of a number of RWE groups and a number of related cases over a short period of time, so the number of such prisoners may decrease as these individuals reach the end of their sentences at a similar times.

⁴¹ Hannah et. al. (2008) *Op. Cit.*

⁴² SPLC, 'Aryan Brotherhood', Southern Poverty Law Centre, Undated. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/aryan-brotherhood>

Increasing Possession and Use of Weapons

REMVE actors' access to weapons has enabled them to pose an increasingly lethal threat. In the United States, where the right to bear arms under the U.S. Constitution's Second Amendment makes access to firearms easier than in most European countries, domestic REMVE actors have increasingly used firearms in recent years.⁴³

A recent case worth noting involves Timothy Watson, a West Virginia resident indicted in November 2020 on charges of conspiracy against the U.S. government and selling devices to convert semi-automatic AR-15 rifles to fully automatic machine guns to violent extremists. Watson allegedly manufactured and supplied hundreds of people with such devices, which he marketed online to adherents of the anti-government extremist "Boogaloo" movement.⁴⁴

The availability of weapons is an issue in other countries as well. The Netherlands, for example, is also seeing an increase in REMVE actors in possession of firearms, while in Germany the domestic intelligence agency has reportedly identified over 1,200 right-wing extremists with legal gun licenses.⁴⁵ Moreover, some REMVE individuals — including Stephan Balliet, who carried out several shootings following a failed attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany, in October 2019 — have used homemade weapons and 3D printed guns.⁴⁶ Edged weapons and explosives have also been used in some REMVE attacks.⁴⁷ In some countries, establishing whether an individual obtaining weapons has criminal intent is a critical issue and difficult to prove.

Another danger is worth noting: REMVE actors' access to more sophisticated weaponry. For example, an investigation in Turin, Italy, led to the July 2019 discovery and seizure of a range of weapons and weapon parts, including an air-to-air missile, being trafficked by an extreme right-wing group in support of the fighting in Ukraine.⁴⁸

Financing

REMVE groups hold bank accounts at local and regional financial institutions,⁴⁹ and use crowdfunding, and other online platforms to fundraise from members and supporters.⁵⁰ REMVE groups use these avenues to collect membership fees and other forms of annual contributions, as well as proceeds from the sale of various paraphernalia, such as flags, T-shirts, badges, patches, and outdoorsman equipment; ticket sales for musical concerts, unarmed combat training, and martial arts "Fight Nights," as well as associated sales of merchandise and food and drink, often at over-inflated prices; and the sale of books and other publications.⁵¹ Alongside these more traditional fundraising measures, some groups have begun using

⁴³ National Constitution Centre, 'Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms', <https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-ii>.

⁴⁴ See US DOJ, 'Jefferson County man admits to unlawful possession of a firearm silencer; Government will seek increased sentence for manufacture and transfer of machine gun conversion devices,' March 16, 2021, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndwv/pr/jefferson-county-man-admits-unlawful-possession-firearm-silencer-government-will-seek>. Watson has since pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm silencer; according to the plea agreement, the government will seek an increased sentence based on evidence it will present of his manufacture and transfer of machine gun conversion devices.

⁴⁵ Deutsche Welle, "Germany: 1,200 right-wing extremists licensed to own weapons," February 2, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-1200-right-wing-extremists-licensed-to-own-weapons/a-56416420>

⁴⁶ Dearden, L. 'Use of 3D guns in German Synagogue shooting must act as a warning to security services, experts say', Independent 11 Oct 19, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/3d-gun-print-germany-synagogue-shooting-stephan-balliet-neo-nazi-a9152746.html> . Edged weapons

⁴⁷ One example is the October 2015 attack in which a REMVE extremist named Anton Lundin Pettersson used a sword to kill three people at a school in Trollhättan, Sweden. The FBI have also seen incidents where REMVE actors have attempted to use explosives or edged weapons for attacks.

⁴⁸ BBC News, 'Italy seizes combat-ready missile in raids on far right', 15 Jul 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48987723>

⁴⁹ See "Donations," Golden Dawn Australia website, accessed 12 January 2021, <http://xa-australia.blogspot.com/p/donations-support-golden-dawn.html>; "Support Us," Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF) website, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://apfeurope.com/donation/>; "Donations," Serbian Radical Party (SRS) website, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/lat/donacije.html> (translated from Serbian); "Your donation for a better Germany!" Der Dritte Weg website, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://der-dritte-weg.info/spenden/> (translated from German); "Donate," Junge Nationalisten website, accessed 12 January 2021, <https://junge-nationalisten.de/mitgliedschaft/#spenden> (translated from German).

⁵⁰ See "Funding Hate: How White Supremacists Raise Their Money," Anti-Defamation League, 2017, <https://www.adl.org/media/10761/download>; "Meet the Undercover Anti-Fascists," Rolling Stone, 14 February 2020, <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/antifa-proud-boys-militia-trump-insurrection-1121933/>; "US far-right extremists making millions via social media and cryptocurrency," The Guardian, 10 March 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/us-far-right-extremists-millions-social-cryptocurrency>.

⁵¹ Johnson, B, 'Financing Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism,' Project CRAFT Research Briefing No. 5. 2020. London: RUSI. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e399e8c6e9872149f4a041/t/5fbb892005f44a5f70a75317/1606125861203/CRAFT+RB5+Final+Version.pdf>

Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as financing tools. Lone actors, on the other hand, who are responsible for most of the recent REMVE attacks, have generally been self-armed and self-funded, leaving few financial traces that would enable early detection of their attack planning.

Inspired or Copycat Attacks

4. Closely track and share information about REMVE propaganda, particularly on which manifestos and other material are serving as inspiration for REMVE groups and actors around the world, for sharing among relevant government agencies, transnationally through bilateral and multilateral channels, and with the public (including the private sector) as appropriate.

5. Closely monitor information about REMVE actors’ new and emerging tactics and techniques which could be used in “copycat” attacks, for sharing as appropriate.

The fluidity of group dynamics and ideology can lead REMVE actors to take violent action based on “inspiration” from previous attacks or propaganda, rather than at the direction of hierarchical leadership.

One example of this dynamic at work is the link between *The Turner Diaries* and REMVE activity over the course of decades. This dystopian 1978 novel depicting a white supremacist revolution was the work of neo-Nazi white supremacist William Pierce, and associated with his establishment of the National Alliance and an increase in severe REMVE attacks.⁵² This white nationalist organisation in turn helped inspire and influence the formation of “The Order” (or “Silent Brotherhood”), a REMVE group responsible for several bank robberies in the early 1980s and the murder of Jewish radio host Alan Berg in Denver, Colorado in June 1984.⁵³ David Lane, a member of The Order involved in Berg’s killing, penned the “Fourteen Words” (“We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children”), which have become a well-known white supremacist slogan.⁵⁴

“The fluidity of group dynamics and ideology can lead REMVE actors to take violent action based on “inspiration” from previous attacks or propaganda, rather than at the direction of hierarchical leadership”



More recently, clippings from *The Turner Diaries* were found in the passenger seat of Timothy McVeigh’s vehicle after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Anders Breivik’s manifesto “2083 — A Declaration of Independence”, also borrowed significantly from the novel⁵⁵, and Brenton Tarrant painted a symbol for the “Fourteen Words” onto one of the weapons he used to carry out the Christchurch Mosque shootings in 2017.⁵⁶

⁵² Berger, J. M. *Alt History: How a self-published, racist novel changed white nationalism and inspired decades of violence*, The Atlantic 16 Sep 2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/how-the-turner-diaries-changed-white-nationalism/500039/>

⁵³ Winter, A. (2011), ‘The Order’, *Religion and Violence: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict*, vol. 2, ed. J. I. Ross, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 542-46. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301432071_The_Order/link/571624e908aed2dd5cfd3c85/download

⁵⁴ ‘David Lane’ in Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) extremist files: <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/david-lane>

⁵⁵ Bromssen (2013) *Op. Cit.*

⁵⁶ Clarke, T, ‘Christchurch Mosque Massacre: Brenton Tarrant’s weapons armed with words in twisted cause’, The West Australian 15 Mar 2019. <https://thewest.com.au/news/world/christchurch-mosque-massacre-brenton-tarrants-weapons-armed-with-words-in-twisted-cause-ng-b881137038z>

There is a particular danger that REMVE attackers will carry out “copycat” attacks, mimicking previous attackers’ methodologies. Brenton Tarrant may have inspired such mimicry by using a helmet-mounted camera to livestream his March 2019 attack on the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, on Facebook Live, which attracted a high volume of international media coverage. Six weeks following the Christchurch attack, John Earnest, a 19-year-old American extremist opened fire on a Passover service at a Southern California synagogue, while wearing “a helmet mounted with a camera that malfunctioned and prevented him from livestreaming the attack”.⁵⁷ Six months later, Stephen Balliett used a helmet camera to livestream his failed attack on the Halle Synagogue, and several of the subsequent shootings that he carried out. Moreover, the fluidity of REMVE adherents’ viewpoints noted earlier may enable these actors to study and learn from the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of terrorists of other types, such as jihadists, with few ideological qualms.

This dynamic of REMVE actors plotting or carrying out attacks mimicking previous attacks’ methodologies or targets is also evident in how certain attackers are later referenced in the “manifestos” left behind by otherwise unconnected would-be attackers. In December 2020, for example, Singaporean authorities detained a 16-year-old extremist who was allegedly planning to carry out an attack on 15 March 2021, the second anniversary of the Christchurch attacks. In a manifesto he had prepared, he called those prior attacks a “justifiable killing of Muslims” and their perpetrator a “saint”. He was planning to replicate the shootings by similarly murdering congregants at two mosques and livestreaming the attack.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Bill Hutchinson, “Alleged San Diego synagogue shooter John Earnest had 50 rounds on him when arrested: Prosecutor,” ABC News, April 30, 2019.

⁵⁸ Shashi Jayakumar, “Singapore: The Lure of the Far-Right,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, February 2, 2021. <https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/02/singapore-the-lure-of-the-far-right/>

B. Legislation and Regulation

Applicable Statutes

6. Ensure the availability of appropriate legislation criminalising violence or plotting of violence by REMVE actors, expressly applicable both to organised groups and to lone actors, regardless of whether such activity has an international dimension or is purely domestic.

Countries take a variety of different legislative approaches to criminalising REMVE activity. In the United States, federal law includes a definition of domestic terrorism, but there is no criminal offence that outlaws domestic terrorism per se. Instead, the U.S. uses regular (non-terrorism-related) criminal statutes to counter domestic terrorism.⁵⁹ This leaves several noteworthy gaps in U.S. authorities’ ability to address domestic threats. Most violent crimes fall within individual states’ jurisdiction, making it difficult for federal investigators and prosecutors to address localised cases. In addition, federal laws only regulate a small subset of weapons (see, e.g. machine guns, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)), and only prohibit firearms possession by a small class of individuals (primarily convicted felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). As a result, extremists can readily obtain semiautomatic weapons and ammunition with limited oversight.

“Countries take a variety of different legislative approaches to criminalising REMVE activity ... Actions by REMVE actors are also sometimes prosecuted under assault or hate crime type offences”

The United Kingdom’s primary counter terrorist legislation, the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000, contains a definition of terrorism that applies to REMVE.⁶⁰ This legislation, framed to cover criminal activity that aims to advance a “racial” or “ideological” cause, contains further sections applicable to extreme right-wing terrorism, terrorist information, preparation of a terrorist act, and a broad range of activities including membership of a proscribed organisation.⁶¹ Actions by REMVE actors are also sometimes prosecuted under assault or hate crime type offences.⁶²

⁵⁹ In the United States, Title 18 U.S. Code Section 2331 (5) sets forth the following definition of domestic terrorism: “Activities that (a) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (b) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (c) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Legal Information Institute, ‘18 U.S. Code § 2331 – Definitions’, Undated, Cornell Law School. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>. There is no sanction associated with this provision, however, nor any criminal offence that outlaws domestic terrorism per se. U.S. prosecutors and investigators still look to Title 18 Section 2331 (5) in evaluating criminal activity, and if the activity meets its definition, they may characterise its perpetrator as a domestic terrorist, regardless of the chargeable offence. Under this law, the subject’s ideology is immaterial. More significantly, the Federal government considers any individual who expresses an ideology through violence, regardless of that ideology’s content, a domestic terrorist. However, while there are a number of potential new statutes being considered by the U.S. Congress, some of which would criminalise domestic (REMVE) terrorism outright, at present the United States uses regular (non-terrorism-related) criminal statutes to counter domestic terrorism.

⁶⁰ Section 1 of TACT 2000 contains the following definition of terrorism, which applies to REMVE: “The use or threat of action where: the action used or threatened: - involves serious violence against a person or serious damage to property; - endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action; - creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or - is designed to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use of the threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation, or intimidate the public or a section of the public; and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.” UK Gov, ‘Terrorism Act 2000’, Undated. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents>

⁶¹ Walker, C. (2009) *Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁶² Sections 28-32 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Sections 145-6 Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) defines racial hate crimes as including “any incident or crime which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race.” UK CPS, ‘Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance’, Undated, Crown Prosecution Service. <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/racist-and-religious-hate-crime-prosecution-guidance>.

In the Netherlands, terrorist activity by REMVE actors may be dealt with through criminal laws including membership of a terrorist organisation, terrorist finance, murder with terrorist intent, discrimination, and insult or incitement to discrimination, violence, and threats.⁶³ As a result, the Dutch approach to dealing with REMVE is similar to dealing with other kinds of violent extremism – looking at illegal acts and the tactics used to commit them, not at the ideology motivating those acts.⁶⁴

In Germany, Section 129a of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as “forming an organisation with the objective, or directed at seriously intimidating the population or destroying or significantly impairing an authority or international organisation”.⁶⁵ This legislation, which dates back to the 1970s, provides for a potential maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.

In recent years, the application of Section 129a has made possible considerable successes in combating REMVE groups, including criminal convictions of members of Gruppe Freital, Oldschool Society (OSS), and Revolution Chemnitz. Moreover, several other provisions of the Criminal Code can also be applied to right wing extremists. Section 129 penalises membership in any criminal association, and has been repeatedly applied in criminal proceedings relating to REMVE groups including Freie Kameradschaft Dresden and Altermedia. Section 129a V penalises support for a terrorist organisation and (special kinds of) propaganda for such a group. Finally, Section 89a allows for prosecution of preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state, whether committed by a group or by a single perpetrator. The latter two offences thus do not require membership in any criminal, let alone terrorist, organisation, and Section 89a, which was specifically designed to deal with “lone actors”, provides for the same potential maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment as Section 129a. Moreover, convictions based on Sections 129a and 89a are perceived by the German public as quite severe, even more so than some other charges that may provide for higher concrete penalties, due to their association with the concepts of terrorism and of violence endangering the state.

Sweden’s criminal code, like many countries’, does not expressly define terrorism as such. The 2003 Law Against Terrorist Offences, however, proscribes any “act [which] could seriously damage a state or an intergovernmental organisation” and “has a certain intent ... for example, to seriously intimidate a population or a population group”.⁶⁶ Two additional Swedish laws cover proscribed offences of terrorist funding, recruitment, training, incitement, and dealings with a terrorist organisation, and a reformed terrorism law has been introduced.⁶⁷

Australia’s terrorism-related legislation criminalises promoting an ideological cause and using or threatening the use of violence, and may thus apply to REMVE activities. In effect, while some ideological motivation is one component of the offence of terrorism, that ideology’s content is immaterial, as is any distinction between domestic and or international terrorism. This is also the case with New Zealand’s 2002 Terrorism Suppression Act, enacted after the 9/11 attacks.⁶⁸

⁶³ Legislationonline, ‘Netherlands Counter-Terrorism’, Undated. <https://www.legislationline.org/legislation/section/legislation/country/12/topic/5>

⁶⁴ CODEXTER, ‘Profiles on Counter-Terrorist Capacity: Netherlands’, November 2008. <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680641014>

⁶⁵ Ritzmann and Rasem (2020) *Op. Cit.* p. 87.

⁶⁶ Gov. Offices of Sweden, ‘Combating Terrorism’, Undated. <https://www.government.se/government-policy/combating-terrorism/>

⁶⁷ Finnsio (2020) *Op. Cit.*

⁶⁸ This legislation defines terrorism as an act that, “is carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause, and with the following intention – to induce terror in a civilian population, to unduly compel or to force a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act. And if it results in one or more of the following outcomes: (1) the death of, or other serious bodily injury to, one or more persons (other than a person carrying out the act), (2) a serious risk to the health or safety of a population, (3) destruction of, or serious damage to, property of great value or importance, or major economic loss, or major environmental damage, if likely to result in one or more outcomes specified in points 1, 2 and 4, (4) serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure facility, if likely to endanger human life, (5) introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to devastate the national economy of a country.” New Zealand Government, ‘Terrorism Suppression Act 2002’, New Zealand Legislation. <https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/55.0/DLM151491.html>

Proscription or Designation of Groups

7. Proscribe or designate as terrorist REMVE groups, so as to criminalise individuals' organisational and supporting activities, to the extent permitted by domestic and international law, including human rights law.

Several countries, beyond defining and criminalising terrorism in legislation, have proscribed or designated entire REMVE groups as terrorist in nature.

In the United Kingdom, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe terrorist organisations under Section 3 of TACT 2000. Doing so enables prosecutors to charge a range of linked offences which would otherwise be unavailable to them: belonging or professing to belong to the organisation, inviting practical support, expressing support, arranging meetings in support of the organisation, wearing clothing, carrying or displaying associated articles in public, and publishing an image, such as a flag or a logo, associated with the organisation.⁶⁹ In December 2016, the U.K. Government for the first time proscribed a REMVE organisation, the neo-Nazi group National Action (NA). More recently, the Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) was proscribed in February 2020, and the related Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) was proscribed in July 2020.⁷⁰

“Proscribing or designating as terrorist REMVE groups can enable prosecutors to charge a range of linked offences which would otherwise be unavailable to them”

Germany has used administrative Banning Orders to target a number of REMVE groups that openly oppose the German Constitution. This step allows the government to administratively strip such groups of their assets and finances, even in the absence of specific criminal actions.⁷¹ Groups that have been subject to banning orders in recent years include Combat 18, Geeinte Völker und Stämme, the Weisse Wolfe Terrorcrew, Wolfsbrigade 44, and Nordadler.

In the European Union more broadly, while most Member States do not have formal legislation to ban REMVE groups as such, some have still taken various legislative approaches and found ways to do so: Finland, for example, has banned the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM); France has banned the Turkish ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves; and Spain has banned Blood and Honour. Some have done so by relying on older legislation passed in response to the Fascist period, which gives them authorities that are relevant.

The Canadian government has also used the administrative listing of both domestic and foreign groups as terrorist entities under the Canadian Criminal Code as an enforcement tool. In Canada, the legal criteria for listing are significantly easier to meet than those for a criminal charge, and in turn give prosecutors the option of pursuing a number of criminal offences such as rendering material support or assistance to a listed entity. Listed entities' assets are also subject to seizure and potential forfeiture. In June 2019, the Canadian government for the first time used this tool to proscribe two REMVE groups, neo-Nazi affiliates

⁶⁹ UK Gov, 'Proscribed Terrorist Organisations', 17 July 2020, HM Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/901434/20200717_Proscription.pdf

⁷⁰ UK Gov (2020) *Op. Cit.*

⁷¹ DW, 'Number of right-wing extremists in Germany on rise, security report suggests', 9 Jul 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-right-wing-extremists/a-54105110>

Blood and Honour and Combat 18.⁷² More recently, in February 2021, it proscribed the Proud Boys, less than a month after group members allegedly joined the mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol Building.⁷³

In March 2020, the Australian government listed Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) as a terrorist organisation under Subsection 102.1 (2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code). Terrorism listings under Australia's Criminal Code enable prosecutors to charge a range of linked offences. Such listings automatically expire after three years unless they are relisted by the Minister for Home Affairs. This is the first time a REMVE group has been proscribed by the Australian government as a terrorist organisation.⁷⁴ Although there are no known direct links between Sonnenkrieg Division and Australians, the organisation's encouragement, promotion and glorification of lone-actor attacks could inspire some Australian violent extremists, and the availability of Sonnenkrieg Division propaganda online has the potential to contribute to the radicalisation of others.

Under United States federal law, the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, can designate as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) meeting the relevant statutory criteria.⁷⁵ As a result of an FTO designation, any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which an FTO has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to Treasury, except as authorised by the Secretary of Treasury; it is a crime for a U.S. person or person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to or receive military-type training from or on behalf of a designated FTO; and certain noncitizens associated with a designated FTO are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances removable from, the United States. The U.S. Government also has authority under Executive Order 13224 to designate as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" individuals and entities that meet certain terrorism-related criteria; as a consequence of such designation, any assets that the designated individual or entity has subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transacting with that individual or entity. In April 2020, the U.S. for the first time designated a REMVE group as a terrorist organisation, adding the Russia-based white supremacist Russian Imperial Movement to the SDGT list.⁷⁶

One factor related to proscription or designation to consider is the fluidity of REMVE group dynamics described earlier, whereby such groups frequently change names or splinter into multiple smaller groups — a dynamic which proscription may even fuel. This may be one reason why some countries whose governments can legally designate domestic groups terrorist organisations, such as Australia, have not used this authority to date. In the United Kingdom, since the December 2016 proscription of National Action (NA), the Home Secretary has found it necessary to proscribe several other groups considered NA aliases: Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action (NS131) in September 2017, followed by the System Resistance Network (SRN) in February 2020.

⁷² West, L. & Nesbitt, M. 'Proscribing Far Right Terrorism: Canada's new terrorist listing of two far right extremist groups', Intrepid 4 July 2019. <https://www.intrepidpodcast.com/blog/2019/7/4/proscribing-far-right-terrorism-canadas-new-terrorist-listing-of-two-far-right-extremist-groups>.

⁷³ Coletta, A. 'Canada declares the Proud Boys a terrorist group', The Washington Post, 3 Feb 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-proud-boys-terrorist-capitol-siege/2021/02/03/546b1d5c-6628-11eb-8468-21bc48f07fe5_story.html

⁷⁴ Sonnenkrieg Division is a United Kingdom-based extreme right-wing organisation which adheres to a violent white supremacist ideology inspired both by the historical National Socialist German Worker's Party (Nazi Party) and by the Satanic Order of the Nine Angles (O9A) movement. It seeks to encourage lone actor terrorist attacks against its political, racial and ethnic enemies, in order to bring about an apocalyptic "race war" and the creation of a global white ethno-state. Sonnenkrieg Division was formed in March 2018 as a splinter group of System Resistance Network (SRN), which is considered an alias of the extreme right-wing terrorist organisation National Action (NA) and has been proscribed by the U.K. Government.

⁷⁵ See US State Department, 'Foreign Terrorist Organizations', Undated, Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

⁷⁶ Savage, C. et. al. 'US will give terrorist label to White Supremacist Group for first time', New York Times 6 Apr 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/terrorist-label-white-supremacy-Russian-Imperial-Movement.html>

Sanctions and Financial Tools

8. Take advantage of financial sanctions that have been used against other types of terrorist group to counter REMVE groups, and devote resources to better understand such groups' financing.

Historically, a range of financial tools have been used to counter terrorist networks, such as the issuance of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), the work of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), and the sanctions and seizures of funding used against terrorist organisations like ISIS and Al-Qa'ida and their leadership. As noted above, domestic actions against particular REMVE groups can, in certain cases, allow governments to significantly restrict their access to financial resources and/or prosecute individuals who provide them with financial or other support. While such traditional methods may be effective against larger, more structured groups, they are of questionable utility in dealing with the lone actors who are increasingly responsible for REMVE violence, and who often plan low-cost, self-funded attacks.

To be sure, there may be instances when financial indicators could assist investigations into lone actors: Anders Breivik, who sold fake university diplomas and maxed out his credit cards to fund his more complex attacks, reportedly decided on the timing of his attack partially due to his financial resources beginning to dry up. This may represent an exceptional case, however, unlikely to reoccur with lone actors who are not plotting such elaborate, resource-intensive attacks.

On the whole, the issue of REMVE financing is still relatively underexplored, and bears further research. There is some nascent international work in this area, as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body which combats money laundering and terrorism financing, has noted the rising REMVE threat. Germany, which currently holds the FATF Presidency, has declared its intention for the body to "prioritise" this challenge and "improve understanding in the international community of financial flows and (cross-border) linkages between these terror groups and individuals, their means and donor structures as well as typical *modi operandi*".⁷⁷

⁷⁷ "Priorities for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) under the German Presidency: Objectives for 2020-2022", July 1, 2020. <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/German-Presidency-Priorities.pdf>.

C. Investigation and Disruption

Organisation and Interagency Coordination

9. Clarify the jurisdictional roles of government agencies in order to ensure a coordinated response to REMVE.

10. Establish both: a) multi-agency investigative task forces with a continuing focus on REMVE threats that leverage the strengths and capabilities of various law enforcement agencies, including prosecution as well as investigative authorities; and b) appropriate processes to coordinate among investigators at the national and local levels, based on a culture of partnership and sharing of knowledge and expertise.

While countries take a variety of approaches to address violent extremist threats, ensuring an organised and efficient response depends on a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities of the government agencies involved. This holds just as true for REMVE as for other forms of violent extremism — if not more so, considering that, as described earlier, REMVE has significant domestic as well as transnational dimensions. At the operational level, most effective systems share certain traits – they employ coordinated task forces to assure collaboration among agencies.

“At the operational level, most effective systems share certain traits – they employ coordinated task forces to assure collaboration among agencies”

Within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency responsible for investigating and countering domestic terrorism by REMVE actors. The FBI is a federal agency with country-wide jurisdiction, but when responding to the REMVE threat relies heavily on relationships with U.S. law enforcement partners at the state and local levels.⁷⁸ Investigations of REMVE actors are often carried out by Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), multi-agency teams of investigators and other specialists that institutionalise this collaboration.⁷⁹ There is a JTTF in every one of the FBI’s 56 Field Offices.⁸⁰ While state and local officers serving on a JTTF are deputised and given federal arrest powers, these investigative teams rely heavily on state and local legal authorities as well. Following the 9/11 attacks of 2001, JTTFs’ chief focus was on international jihadist terrorism. Since then, however, as the threat from domestic terrorism, and REMVE in particular, has significantly increased, these task forces’ efforts are now more balanced, with attention paid to both international and domestic terror threats.

In the United Kingdom, Counter Terrorist Policing had sole responsibility for countering the extreme right-wing threat prior to 2017. Following several attacks that year, including Darren Osborne’s vehicle ramming near Finsbury Park Mosque, changes were made to increase police collaboration with intelligence partners in relation to REMVE terrorism. As the REMVE threat in the United Kingdom has grown and is now considered to pose a major threat to national security, the government decided in April 2020 that

⁷⁸ DHS, ‘Fusion Centres’, 19 Sep 2019, Department of Homeland Security, US Gov. <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers>

⁷⁹ FBI, ‘Joint Terrorism Task Forces’, Undated, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Gov. <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces>

⁸⁰ FBI, ‘Field Offices’, Undated, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Gov. <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices#:~:text=The%20FBI%20has%2056%20field,partners%20on%20cases%20and%20operations.>

the Security Service (MI5)⁸¹ should formally take primacy for countering what the U.K. Government terms Right-Wing Terrorism (RWT).⁸² As with other forms of terrorism in the United Kingdom, the response falls under the wider CONTEST Strategy, which involves working across policing, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies and other government departments.⁸³ This strategy has four key strands: PREVENT – Identify, Manage, Safeguard; PURSUE – Detect, Investigate, Disrupt; PROTECT – People, Places and Materials; and PREPARE – Readiness, Respond and Recover.

Many other countries have adopted similar approaches to sharing responsibility for countering and disrupting the REMVE threat between various agencies within the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

In the Netherlands, while responsibility for coordinating counter-terrorist responses, including REMVE, sits with the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid-NCTV*), combating the threat involves a range of agencies.⁸⁴ This includes the General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst-AIVD*), the Dutch National Police (KNP), the Public Prosecution Service, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, and Dutch municipalities.

In New Zealand, the police have a dedicated National Security Investigations Team, responsible for investigating and disrupting any type of terrorist threat, with four operational units deployed across the Country. These units work with the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), which is tasked with the protection of New Zealand from both domestic and external threats, including various forms of terrorism.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have followed a similar multi-agency approach to the U.S., establishing Joint Task Forces which bring together Federal, State, and Territory police and intelligence agencies in Joint Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTTs).

Investigative Focus and Resources

11. Ensure that law enforcement agencies devote organisational focus and resources commensurate to the increasing REMVE threat, including personnel and equipment in addition to financing.

As the level of REMVE activity has risen, police services and criminal justice practitioners more broadly have increased their investigative focus on this threat. In the United Kingdom, as previously noted, REMVE investigations now represent around ten per cent of the national Counter Terrorist Policing caseload, an all-time high. In the Netherlands, where there is growing police and security agency focus on REMVE conspiracies and attacks are considered conceivable, police are increasingly opening counter-terrorist investigations against both REMVE individuals and organisations. Within Australia, as of June 2020, extreme right-wing matters comprised approximately 40% of intelligence caseloads, and as forecast by the Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the threat is real and growing.

In addition to increasing the investigative resources that JTTFs devote to domestic terrorism, the United States outlined a new focus on this threat in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism of 2018.⁸⁵ This shift in resources and focus was also reflected in the Department of Homeland Security's *Strategic Framework for*

⁸¹ MI5, 'Counter-Terrorism', Undated, Security Service MI5. <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/counter-terrorism>

⁸² Dodd, V. 'MI5 to take over in fight against rise of UK rightwing extremism', The Guardian 28 Oct 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/28/mi5-lead-battle-against-uk-rightwing-extremists-police-action>

⁸³ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism', June 2018, Cm 9608, London: HMSO. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/714404/060618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_PRINT.PDF

⁸⁴ Government of the Netherlands, 'Counterterrorism and National Security', Undated. <https://www.government.nl/topics/counterterrorism-and-national-security>

⁸⁵ US Gov, 'National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America', POTUS October 2018. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=816990>.

Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, released in 2019.⁸⁶ The FBI, which regularly collaborates with DHS and other federal agencies to develop and craft new models for counter-terrorism, has also developed an approach to domestic violent extremism comprised of REMVE alongside three other categories (abortion extremism, animal rights and Earth Liberation Organisation, and anti-government and anti-authority groups).

Individual Risk Assessment

12. Build risk assessment tools to help identify individuals' vulnerability to REMVE radicalisation and violence. Such tools should both: a) leverage existing tools (in light of similarities in risk factors and radicalisation processes across different forms of violent extremism); and b) reflect features peculiar to REMVE ideology and dynamics.

Investigators can use risk assessment tools to build a better understanding of determined REMVE actors as well as individuals vulnerable to radicalisation.

In the Netherlands, for example, the Dutch police have developed a risk assessment tool, the Indicator of Radicalisation (IR), to better assess what phase of the radicalisation process an individual may have reached. Version 1.0 of this tool focuses exclusively on the threat of radicalisation to violent jihadism, but version 2.0, currently in development, will also look at individuals at risk of radicalisation by extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing ideologies.⁸⁷ Once operationalised, version 2.0 of this IR Tool will provide all Dutch police units with uniform standards and insights to assess a subject's level of radicalisation and the risk of their taking violent action. With these assessment models, the police will be able to make a more informed decision about whether to monitor a given individual actively or passively. If appropriate, the individual can be assessed in more detail by a Multi-Disciplinary Case Management Team at a "Regional Safety House," as detailed later in this Guide.

"Risk assessment tools that help law enforcement assess individuals' level of radicalisation can lead to more informed considerations of trade-offs between pre-emptive intervention and continued covert investigation"

German investigators also conduct individualised threat assessments based on behavioural activity. Their risk assessment approach has two stages. An initial tool generally assesses whether a subject's risk of radicalisation to violence is high or moderate. If the initial assessment situates the subject in the high-risk "red area", a second, more detailed individual assessment extensively analyses the subject's background to better understand their actions. Behavioural analysis can also be used to identify possible opportunities for disengagement efforts.

Other European countries have established similar processes, such as Estonia, which has issued police officers with manuals to assist them in identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation to violence and conducting assessment interviews. In 2020, the Council of Europe (COE) itself issued a set of indicators

⁸⁶ US DHS, 'Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence', Department of Homeland Security September 2019. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf

⁸⁷ The Dutch IR Tool considers an individual's Ideology (Intentions) alongside Social Context (Capabilities) and a model of the phases of radicalisation — a Preliminary Phase, Social Estrangement, Acceptance of the Use of Violence, Extremism, and Willingness to Use Violence. Applying this framework during investigations into attacks on 5G cellular towers in the Netherlands suggested that models based on radicalisation to violent jihadism worked quite effectively when dealing with REMVE radicalisation, with individuals in the respective radicalisation processes exhibiting broadly similar behaviours.

for identifying individuals at very high risk of committing terrorist actions, intended to apply regardless of the at-risk individual's ideological motivation.

13. Intervene pre-emptively to overtly warn REMVE actors of potential legal consequences, based on careful consideration of the costs and benefits of pre-emptive action as opposed to continued covert investigation.

Some REMVE actors will progressively test legal boundaries to see what they can “get away with” unchecked, and will only escalate if they do not appear to have encountered any form of official resistance. Given the challenges that successful investigations and prosecutions of REMVE conduct can involve, and the resources they can require, law enforcement will at times intervene to overtly warn individuals at risk of or in the early stages of engaging in extremist activity of the potential legal consequences of their actions. Police in Norway, for instance, have found significant success in disrupting potential nascent REMVE plotting by warning the individuals involved through telephone calls or “door knocks”. The goal of such early intervention is to pre-empt the planning or perpetration of violence or other criminal activity, and lead individuals under investigation to disengage from violent extremism. It can also allow criminal justice practitioners to better prioritise their finite investigative resources. At the same time, there are potential downsides: alerting hardened violent extremists to the fact that they are being monitored, which may lead them to continue their activity in a form that is more difficult to detect and disrupt, or simply losing the opportunity to gain a better understanding of subjects’ networks of contacts and to identify others who may pose a threat. Risk assessment tools that help law enforcement assess individuals’ level of radicalisation and the risk of their taking violent action can lead to more informed considerations of these trade-offs between pre-emptive intervention and continued covert investigation. When pre-emptive warnings are given, they can be more effective when coupled with other forms of intervention, such as de-radicalisation programmes.

Group and Network Analysis

14. Develop approaches for analysing REMVE actors at a network level, rather than focusing exclusively on individuals or organised groups, given the complex, fluid nature of REMVE dynamics.

In addition to analysing individual REMVE actors, criminal justice practitioners have also developed ways to better understand the complexity of REMVE group and network dynamics. The Netherlands National Police (*Korps Nationale Politie-KNP*) have developed a particularly notable “swarm” approach to investigation and analysis. Previously, investigations of right-wing extremism tended to focus either on groups or individuals. Dutch police considered this approach flawed when facing an ecosystem of many small REMVE groups, regularly breaking up, morphing, and changing names, with a diverse range of ad hoc ideologies, and many of the same individuals appearing to belong to multiple different groups. In light of these dynamics, they introduced the “swarm” approach, whereby police now examine individuals’ experiences and sociability, rather than organisational structure, within volatile online communities. Using this approach, police seek to identify the fluid links between them without focusing on traditional ties of group membership.⁸⁸ This approach provides the KNP with a more agile way to identify emerging REMVE dynamics and threats. Relevant links are sometimes transnational, which has made it important for Dutch investigators to work with international partners.

⁸⁸ See Allchorn, W, ‘Technology and the Swarm: A dialogic turn in online far-right activism’, Vox Pol 11 Mar 2020. <https://www.voxpol.eu/technology-and-the-swarm-a-dialogic-turn-in-online-far-right-activism/>

Network analysis has also proven one of U.S. investigators' critical tools in identifying previously unknown REMVE actors. The FBI focuses not only on individual actors, but also on broader networks, seeking to identify links between actors within them. In such investigations, it is important to strike a balance between disrupting individual REMVE actors and gathering more information about the ecosystem in which they operate, and other actors they are connected to — arguably more challenging when dealing with networks than with hierarchical groups. In response to such threats, the FBI, like the Dutch police, work closely with international partners.

In Germany, the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA) assists police and other criminal justice practitioners in better understanding REMVE networks, as well as individual actors, by producing a *Handbuch Extremismuspraevention* (Handbook of Extremist Prevention, or HEX). This handbook covers all forms of violent extremism, including extreme right-wing networks, with various chapters on ideology, exploitation of the online space, and other REMVE-related issues.⁸⁹ The HEX emphasises the need for practitioners to improve their awareness of REMVE, particularly after years of focusing on violent jihadists, and for governments to share intelligence and better cooperate in order to counter this increasing transnational threat.

Insider Threat Mitigation

15. Develop system to track and counter potential “insider threat” of violent extremists operating within the ranks of the police or military forces, or in other positions of public trust.

A challenge associated with REMVE actors which warrants particular focus is the potential “insider threat” of violent extremists operating within the ranks of the police or military forces, or in other positions of public trust. This threat has already come to light in a number of countries.

In the United Kingdom, serving members of the British Army and of the Metropolitan Police have been arrested and charged with membership of National Action in the four years since this REMVE group was proscribed under the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000.⁹⁰ In Germany, several REMVE-related incidents attributed to the 2nd Company of the elite KSK Special Commando Forces, and allegations that such sympathies were widespread within the company's ranks, led the Defence Ministry to disband that company entirely in July 2020.⁹¹ Some European REMVE groups, such as the Slovakian neo-Nazi paramilitary movement Vzbor Kysuce (VK), are known to have called on members to join the police or military for the very purpose of receiving training and access.⁹²

Several recent terrorist plots in the U.S. have also involved REMVE actors in the military or former soldiers. In January 2020, Patrik Mathews, a 26-year-old member of the Canadian Army Reserves,⁹³ was arrested by the FBI in Maryland after plotting terrorist attacks in the United States in coordination with members

⁸⁹ Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), '*Handbuch Extremismuspraevention*', 10 July 2020. https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/PolizeiUndForschung/1_54_HandbuchExtremismuspraevention.html

⁹⁰ BC News, '*Neo-Nazi Arrests: National Action suspects are in the Army*', 5 Sep 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41161233>. Badshah, N, and Dodd, V, '*Met Police officer charged with belonging to far-right terror group*', The Guardian 9 Jul 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jul/09/met-police-officer-charged-with-belonging-to-far-right-terror-group>

⁹¹ Deutsche Welle, '*KSK: German special forces company dissolved due to far-right concerns*', 30 Jul 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/ksk-german-special-forces-company-dissolved-due-to-far-right-concerns/a-54386661>

⁹² Intelligence Fusion, '*Right Wing Group Profiles: Slovakia*', undated. <https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/blog/right-wing-group-profiles-slovakia>

⁹³ McCarten, J. '*Alleged Canadian neo-Nazi pleads not guilty to weapons charges in US court*', Global News 18 Feb 2020. <https://globalnews.ca/news/6562728/patrik-mathews-court-maryland/>

of the white supremacist group known as The Base.⁹⁴ In June 2020, 22-year-old U.S. Army private soldier Ethan Melzer was arrested after trying to organise an ambush of his own unit by sending detailed sensitive information to a United Kingdom-based neo-Nazi white supremacist group and satanic cult, Order of the Nine Angles (O9A).⁹⁵ His intention was for this information to be conveyed to jihadist terrorists in the area where his unit was deployed abroad, to facilitate an attack on the unit.⁹⁶ Active-duty U.S. Air Force Sergeant Steven Carrillo has been charged with several counts of murder and attempted murder related to a May 2020 drive-by shooting which resulted in the death of a federal protective service officer guarding the U.S. courthouse building in Oakland the previous month, and a June 2020 ambush shooting which resulted in the death of a sheriff's deputy.⁹⁷ Carrillo was allegedly linked to the extremist Boogaloo movement, which advocates for anti-government violence.

As these examples illustrate,⁹⁸ the threat of violent extremist individuals within law enforcement or the military involves multiple risks. Such “insiders” have access to weapons, explosives, training, and intelligence. Due to their positions, moreover, they are provided with levels of trust that could facilitate attack planning.⁹⁹

Governments should address this potential “insider” threat proactively by developing systems to identify individuals with potentially REMVE affiliations or sympathies within the ranks of the police and military forces. Such systems should include education of police and military leaders as well as of rank-and-file personnel, to improve awareness of REMVE, its unique features, and warning signs of radicalisation. Stringent security vetting — particularly of personnel with greater access to weapons, intelligence, and potentially high-value targets — is also crucial. Governments should also incorporate REMVE concerns into their insider threat mitigation programs for other positions of public trust, such as transportation security or key critical infrastructure sector positions.

“The threat of violent extremist individuals within law enforcement or the military involves multiple risks, including access to weapons, training and intelligence”

⁹⁴ This small, militant neo-Nazi network emerged in 2018 and is active in several countries. Members claim that they are defending the white European race against corruption, and espouse “accelerationist” beliefs, seeking to launch actions that act as catalysts for the collapse of society and the initiation of a race war. Wilson, J, ‘Revealed: The true identity of the leader of an American neo-Nazi terror group’. The Guardian 24 Jan 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/23/revealed-the-true-identity-of-the-leader-of-americas-neo-nazi-terror-group>. See also ADL, ‘The Base’, Undated, Anti-Defamation League. <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/the-base>

⁹⁵ US DOJ, ‘US Army Soldier charged with Terrorism offenses for planning deadly Ambush on service members in his unit’. DOJ Office of Public Affairs 22 June 2020. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-army-soldier-charged-terrorism-offenses-planning-deadly-ambush-service-members-his-unit>

⁹⁶ Melzer has been charged with conspiring and attempting to murder U.S. nationals, conspiring and attempting to murder military service members, providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists, and conspiring to murder and maim in a foreign country.

⁹⁷ Air Force Times, ‘Air Force sergeant pleads not guilty in killing of sheriff's deputy’, 27 Aug 20. <https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2020/08/27/air-force-sergeant-pleads-not-guilty-in-killing-of-sheriffs-deputy/>. See also US DOJ, ‘Two Defendants Charged with Murder and Aiding and Abetting in Slaying of Federal Protective Service Officer at Oakland Courthouse Building’, June 16, 2020. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-defendants-charged-murder-and-aiding-and-abetting-slaying-federal-protective-service-officer-at-oakland-courthouse-building>

⁹⁸ See also the examples of Craig Lang and Jarrett William Smith, described *infra* in the section on Travel to Conflict Zones.

⁹⁹ Koehler, D, ‘A Threat from Within? Exploring the link between the Extreme Right and the Military’, ICCT Policy Brief, The Hague, September 2019. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2019/09/ICCT-Koehler-A-Threat-from-Within-Exploring-the-Link-between-the-Extreme-Right-and-the-Military.pdf>

Online Investigation and Disruption

16. Invest significant investigative resources in monitoring and analysing REMVE actors' online activity, and build close relations with internet platforms and providers to obtain information on and counter those actors' exploitation of the online environment, in accordance with freedom of expression and privacy rights.

Online investigations are critical to countering REMVE actors. Such investigations can benefit from the use of technologies including algorithms, machine learning, artificial intelligence (AI), and social network mapping, but should be carried out in strict compliance with constitutional and international human rights, including rights to freedom of expression and to privacy. In many countries, dedicated law enforcement units coordinate with the private sector to tackle this problem.

Germany uses Joint Internet Centres which monitor open-source intelligence, leads, and any criminal propaganda related to the extreme right-wing. Italy has a police division for Communications Monitoring, with the ability to intervene when extreme right-wing actors' online hate discourse reaches the level of a criminal offence. The Dutch police also have a special section which works with social media and other companies, attempting to identify the producers of violent extremist online material, though data protection and privacy regulations and laws often prevent companies from responding quickly to police inquiries.

Multilateral organisations can play a role in this context as well. The European Union (EU) law enforcement agency, Europol, has effectively shared intelligence on violent jihadist activity online among member states, as well as coordinating between member states and major social media companies, but there is a need to expand effective monitoring of extreme right-wing content. The EU Internet Forum has been focused on jihadist extremists as well, but recent REMVE attacks in New Zealand, Germany and the United States, and a flood of related online content, have triggered an EU Crisis Protocol, a rapid-response mechanism to facilitate the containment of violent extremist content online. This work involves close cooperation with the Internet Referral Unit (IRU) and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).¹⁰⁰

Obtaining information from social media companies in a form that is admissible in judicial proceedings is a related issue. International mutual legal assistance (MLA) processes can be valuable, but require navigating differences among various jurisdictions' applicable protections of privacy interests and freedom of speech. Particular challenges are involved in gaining access to or obtaining information from closed chat groups and encrypted communication to which REMVE actors are increasingly resorting.

¹⁰⁰ Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). <https://gifct.org/>

17. When consistent with domestic and international law, including human rights law, and based on careful consideration of the costs and benefits, provide information to internet platforms and providers so that they can make informed decisions about enforcing their terms of service through the voluntary removal of hateful content, and when necessary the blocking of REMVE actors from accessing particular platforms.

Criminal justice practitioners may sometimes seek to disrupt ongoing REMVE activities through requests to internet platforms and providers for “deplatforming” — not only the removal of hateful content but the blocking of violent extremist actors from accessing particular social media platforms. The fluid nature of REMVE network dynamics can make this more challenging, as even organised groups, let alone individuals, may frequently change platforms, sometimes on a daily basis.

In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed strong relationships with online social media providers by giving them regular briefings and keeping them apprised of relevant trends and threats. This allows providers to more effectively remove posts that breach their protocols and agreements. When appropriate, the FBI also uses legal processes to obtain additional information from providers. The United Kingdom has established a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), which the public (and other investigation agencies and partners) can make aware of harmful content that breaches the provisions of TACT 2000, at which point the CTIRU can engage with internet providers to request that material be taken down. U.K. investigators have found that smaller platforms, such as gaming platforms, often prove more difficult to coordinate with.

While depriving REMVE of online platforms can be a good thing which helps stop or reduce the level of radicalisation to violence, there is a downside: losing those intelligence streams. In a particular investigation, a decision may have to be made if and when to request deplatforming of a violent extremist actor, based on the existing facts at the time. The decision may be to refrain from seeking to cut off the actor’s access to a particular platform, but there must be a risk assessment and a judgement made as to the appropriate time and place to take action. Moreover, it is worth considering that deplatforming certain groups or actors entirely — or even intervening frequently to remove hateful content — from larger platforms can lead violent extremists to move to smaller more inaccessible platforms. Criminal justice practitioners will thus need to acquire more expertise in working with “fringe” platforms, such as gaming platforms, particularly as such smaller companies have more limited resources and capabilities to assist.

International Cooperation

18. Establish bilateral and multilateral channels for regular communication and coordination in countering potentially transnational REMVE threats, including the establishment of joint investigative teams and sharing of intelligence or evidence as appropriate.

The increasingly transnational nature of REMVE activities makes it imperative for law enforcement, intelligence, and other government agencies to deepen international cooperation in order to better understand, disrupt and counter such threats.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Pantucci, R. ‘Cooperating in Tackling Extreme Right Wing Ideologies and Terrorism’, RUSI Commentary 18 Dec 2020. <https://rusi.org/commentary/cooperating-tackling-extreme-right-wing-ideologies-and-terrorism>

Criminal justice practitioners in the United Kingdom have found international cooperation valuable to improve their understanding of partner countries' relevant legal frameworks and transferable good practices, as well as to identify opportunities to coordinate investigative and operational responses to particular threats. The FBI Extra-Territorial Investigations Unit, in addition to several other U.S. agencies, has similarly built close relationships with international partners that have facilitated the sharing of good practices in intelligence, the de-confliction of online assets, and, when appropriate, joint operations and investigations. Opportunities may also exist to share specific intelligence to assist in the disruption of emerging threats, and in some instances potential evidentiary material in a form that is admissible in judicial proceedings.

To facilitate such international communication and engagement, some countries' law enforcement agencies have established single points of contact (SPOCs), embedding their own personnel as liaison officers with foreign partners. U.K. Counter Terrorism Policing has established a global network of Counter Terrorism Police Liaison Officers (CTPLOs). Germany has established SPOCs with partner countries' prosecution services as well. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) maintains an extensive international liaison officer network that includes Five Eyes (FVEY – US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) intelligence cooperation, as well as officers at Europol and in Asia and the Pacific. These networks work closely with partners on various counter-terrorist matters, including REMVE, and have previously proved invaluable in rapidly coordinating responses and cooperation. An associated benefit is improvement of the understanding of partners' concerns and capabilities, as well as what legal thresholds and constraints they operate under.

“Criminal justice practitioners have found international cooperation valuable to improve their understanding of partner countries' legal frameworks and good practices, as well as to identify opportunities to coordinate responses to particular threats”

In addition to bilateral relationships, multilateral organisations such as Europol and Interpol can facilitate cooperation and coordination of efforts to counter REMVE threats, as they have done in the context of other types of terrorist threats. Eurojust can also play an important role, coordinating cross-border investigations, facilitating Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), and hosting coordination meetings where investigative authorities can meet and share information and evidence.¹⁰² Such organisations can help countries identify particular opportunities for de-confliction or resource pooling. They can also act as repositories for international knowledge and expertise, collecting and collating information on REMVE threats more broadly to improve members' understanding of trends in attack planning or other group activities, larger network dynamics, and evolutions of propaganda content or recruitment methodologies. To the latter end, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) has recently held several exploratory dialogues on REMVE, to determine whether and how existing GCTF resources may be applied to counter REMVE threats.

¹⁰² Eurojust, Undated. <https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/>

Monitoring of Travel to Conflict Zones

19. Share information transnationally to enable close monitoring of REMVE actors' travel to active conflict zones, for criminal justice or other action as consistent with relevant national legislation.

One aspect of the increasing danger posed by REMVE which demands particular international cooperation is the threat of individuals or small groups travelling internationally to take part in armed conflicts, with the conflict in Ukraine being a particular focal point.¹⁰³ Up to 1,000 foreign nationals have been involved in fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Many have extreme right associations, including members of organised groups such as the NRM. Moreover, some groups native to Ukraine which are taking part in the fighting themselves fall into the extreme right-wing category, notably the Azov Battalion, part of the wider Azov movement which is linked to a range of extreme right-wing and REMVE networks from across the United States, Europe, and as far as New Zealand.¹⁰⁴

This emerging dynamic highlights the potential for REMVE actors to travel across borders to carry out terrorist attacks in other countries, but also to travel to zones where active conflict is taking place — where they can train, use firearms, and gain operational experience — before returning to their home countries. The danger is that those actors could then use the skills and experience they have acquired abroad to conduct attacks at home. One notable example involves Craig Lang, a former U.S. soldier who travelled to Ukraine in 2015 and fought for a right-wing paramilitary group known as the “Right Sector” on the side of the Ukrainian government in its war against separatists. Lang was later allegedly involved in carrying out a 2018 armed robbery and double murder in Florida during a return trip to the U.S., and has been indicted on several federal charges in that connection. A superseding indictment, alleging that Lang and a co-conspirator planned to fight the Venezuelan government and committed the robbery to fund their travel for that purpose, also charged him with conspiring to kill, kidnap, or maim persons in a foreign country and with a violation of the Neutrality Act. Lang is currently detained in Ukraine, which has rejected a recent extradition request from the United States.¹⁰⁵

Sharing information across borders is thus particularly crucial to enable close monitoring of REMVE actors' travel to active conflict zones, for criminal justice action as appropriate. At present, whereas many jihadist foreign terrorist fighters returned to their home countries from Syria and Iraq have faced detention and prosecution, few extreme right-wing FTFs have incurred legal consequences — and indeed travel to other conflict zones, to fight for groups which may not be designated as terrorist organisations, may be less likely to have in fact breached existing domestic criminal laws in many jurisdictions.¹⁰⁶ International coordination is all the more valuable to ensuring effective strategies to investigate and disrupt such FTFs' activities and prevent them from carrying out attacks within the constraints of existing national legislation.

¹⁰³ Rekawek, K. 'Neither NATO's Foreign Legion nor the Donbas International Brigades: (Where are all the) Foreign Fighters in Ukraine', Policy Paper No. 6 (108), March 2015, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM); [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189979/PISM%20Policy%20Paper%20no%206%20\(108\).pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189979/PISM%20Policy%20Paper%20no%206%20(108).pdf)

¹⁰⁴ Shuster, S. and Perrigo, B. 'Like, Share, Recruit: How a White-Supremacist Militia uses Facebook to radicalise and train new members', Time 7 Jan 2021. <https://time.com/5926750/azov-far-right-movement-facebook/>

¹⁰⁵ See US DOJ, 'Additional Charges Filed Against Two Men Related To 2018 Homicide And Armed Robbery Of Florida Couple,' December 5, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/additional-charges-filed-against-two-men-related-2018-homicide-and-armed-robbery>. See also Andrew E. Kramer, 'U.S. Prosecutors Call Him a Murderer. To Ukraine He's an Asylum Seeker,' *The New York Times*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-right-wing-rmilitias.html>. Moreover, active-duty U.S. soldier Jarrett William Smith, who was charged with and pleaded guilty to distributing instructions for making explosives, destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction over social media, allegedly expressed a desire to travel to the Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion. See US DOJ, 'Former Fort Riley Soldier Sentenced For Distributing Info on Napalm, IEDs,' August 19, 2020. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/former-fort-riley-soldier-sentenced-distributing-info-napalm-ieds>.

¹⁰⁶ Rekawek, K. 'Current European policies dealing with returned extreme right-wing foreign fighters', presentation in CEP Webinar: The State and Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with Islamist and Right-Wing extremist backgrounds, 30 November 2020. <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/cep-webinar-state-and-foreign-terrorist-fighters-islamist-and-right-wing-extremist>

Intelligence

20. Collect and produce timely counter-terrorist intelligence on REMVE actors and networks, exploiting open-source intelligence as well as covertly obtained forms, and using fusion centres as needed, while ensuring appropriate coordination between law enforcement agencies and intelligence services.

Intelligence services, in addition to criminal justice actors, may play an important role in countering REMVE threats. Although the need to protect sources and methods, among other sensitivities, precludes revealing operational details, several countries have already found intelligence activities critical in detecting and disrupting threats of this type.

Covertly obtained forms of intelligence, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), represent one component of an intelligence approach to REMVE. In order to successfully use human sources, whether operating online or in person, to disrupt REMVE activities, intelligence agencies should carefully and appropriately tailor collection plans to account for the diverse nature of this extremist milieu. Due to REMVE networks' increasingly youthful demographic makeup, there is a need to identify and recruit appropriately aged HUMINT sources.

In addition to undercover and sensitive covert capabilities, a range of countries, including within the European Union, have found that open-source intelligence (OSINT) can be particularly valuable as a tool in dealing with REMVE groups and individuals. Many of these actors conduct at least part of their activities in public view online, leaving traces of recruitment activities or of individual radicalisation to violence which OSINT operations can identify. As with intelligence approaches to other types of violent extremist actors and networks, fusion centres can be a valuable tool to merge numerous strands of intelligence from various sources.

Criminal justice practitioners should be aware that intelligence services may be taking an interest in the same REMVE groups they are investigating, and coordinate as appropriate according to national legal protocols. The Netherlands, for example, uses specialised units to better coordinate local police intelligence on REMVE and other violent extremist actors. Each of the country's ten Regional Police Units and its Central Unit have a CTER (Counter Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation) Intelligence Cell. In the United Kingdom, as noted earlier, the police have worked more closely with their intelligence service partners in countering REMVE actors since the attacks of 2017. The New Zealand police have a high-level Security and Intelligence Threats Group, while each of the 12 police districts has an intelligence team, all guided by the New Zealand strategy, "Transforming Intelligence 2021," which was launched in 2018.¹⁰⁷ In Germany, the government established the GETZ (*Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum*), an intelligence fusion centre with international links, in 2012.¹⁰⁸ The GETZ fuses intelligence on the extreme-right threat, as well as on extreme left-wing terrorism, bringing together 40 agencies to coordinate discussion, including state police and German Federal institutions.¹⁰⁹ Likewise, to better fuse and coordinate intelligence on the growing REMVE threat in the U.S., in 2019 the FBI formed a Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell.¹¹⁰

Finally, it is worth noting that using information gathered in an intelligence investigation as evidence in a criminal trial can be complicated, due to the need to balance defendants' fair trial rights with the protection of security interests, but is sometimes feasible nevertheless. In some jurisdictions it is indeed possible for intelligence-derived information to be declassified or otherwise sanitised for use in judicial proceedings.

¹⁰⁷ New Zealand Government Royal Commission (2020) *Op. Cit.*

¹⁰⁸ BfV, 'GETZ', undated, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/verfassungsschutz/auftrag/zusammenarbeit-im-in-und-ausland/getz/getz_node.html.

¹⁰⁹ See also Van der Veer, R. et. al. 'Fusion Centres in Six European Countries: Emergence, Roles and Challenges', ICCT Report February 2019. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2019/02/ICCT-VanderVeer-Bos-VanderHeide-Fusion-Centres-in-Six-European-Countries.pdf>

¹¹⁰ FBI, 'Confronting White Supremacy', Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement before House Oversight Committee, 4 June 2019. <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-white-supremacy>

D. Prosecution¹¹¹

Charging and Sentencing

21. Prosecute REMVE offenders on the most serious readily provable charges available, taking advantage as necessary of non-terrorism-related criminal statutes, such as for weapons violations or hate crimes.

22. Use language of appropriate gravity to characterise REMVE offenders' conduct, regardless of the chargeable offence, in order to communicate condemnation of such violent extremism to a public audience.

23. Establish sentencing guidelines for courts, whether mandatory or discretionary, which apply to REMVE violence or plotting of violence and reflect the gravity of those offences.

As detailed above, many countries have anti-terrorism legislation that applies to REMVE offences just as it does to other forms of terrorism. Prosecutors may confront several issues in applying the statutes, however. Some country's legislation, like the United Kingdom's, is principally directed against individuals, which makes it more challenging to hold the broader groups to which attackers may belong accountable. This is also the case in Canada, where proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a group or its leaders are criminally culpable for a member's actions can be difficult.¹¹²

In other countries, such as Germany, on the other hand, terrorism-related offences may not be chargeable against attackers with no formal or at least material ties to a structured terrorist organisation. Similarly, in Belgium, while the same anti-terrorism legislation applies to any terrorist threat, whatever its ideological motivation¹¹³, prosecutors must prove an individual defendant's links to an organised group in order to secure a conviction.¹¹⁴

In the absence of U.S. federal anti-terrorism legislation that specifically applies to domestic REMVE actors, prosecutors have found creative solutions to charging and disrupting those posing a threat. Criminal justice investigations into REMVE offences are often resolved using traditional, non-terrorism-related federal criminal statutes, including firearms offences or explosives violations. Many domestic terrorism cases are also resolved under state (or local), rather than federal (or national) law. Regardless of the offences which they are able to charge, prosecutors may still seek to show that the criminal conduct involved is not "ordinary" criminal conduct, and that subjects were in essence engaged in a form of terrorism. Successfully demonstrating this can help judges at detention hearings make appropriate decisions as to whether to set or deny bail for individuals. Later, following convictions, a successful demonstration that an offender's conduct qualifies as domestic terrorism can lead courts to impose "terrorism enhancements", resulting in longer sentences.

¹¹¹ This section focuses on criminal prosecution, in line with this *Practitioner's Guide*, but it is worth noting that in some contexts private parties have successfully brought civil lawsuits against REMVE actors. In the United States, for example, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) has successfully won monetary damages for victims of violence committed by members of the Ku Klux Klan through civil suits.

¹¹² See Government of Canada, *Anti-Terrorism Act 2001*, Undated, Justice Laws Website. <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/a-11.7/page-1.html>

¹¹³ Legislationline, *'Belgian Counter-Terrorism'*, Undated. <https://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/5>

¹¹⁴ Weyembergh, A. & Cocq, C. (2015) *'Belgium'*, in Roach, K. (ed.) *Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 234-268.

In many countries, hate crime legislation is a tool that can be used to investigate and prosecute REMVE individuals who commit various offences that do not meet all the criteria for terrorism. In the case of plotting or incitement, rather than actual violence, it may be difficult to show that subjects' activity has cleared the threshold separating hateful but protected speech from criminal conduct. In many situations, however, prosecutors from countries ranging from the United States and the United Kingdom to Belgium have found hate crimes the most serious readily provable charges that they can pursue.¹¹⁵

Particular creativity and care are required when charging individuals who intend to carry out REMVE attacks but have not moved beyond an early planning stage, when the type of attack being planned and the intent behind it may be difficult to prove. In the United States, such situations may fall under the umbrella of "material support for terrorism," a federal offence. Many countries, including the United Kingdom, have a preparatory offence that allows them to reach more preliminary conduct than the U.S. (where an attempt requires a substantial step, and a conspiracy requires an overt act).

Finally, while REMVE plotting, incitement, or related activity taking place online may lack the elements required to charge for many terrorism-related offences, in some countries there are entirely separate offences which are specific to the internet, or to communications media generally, and indeed apply to such activity. Belgian prosecutors, in dealing with REMVE actors, use the Racism Act and anti-hate crime legislation, but anything written on the internet can be considered media crimes.¹¹⁶ Likewise, U.S. prosecutors have charged REMVE actors with malicious online communications and cyber stalking offences.

"In many countries, non-terrorism-related statutes such as hate crime legislation can be used to investigate and prosecute REMVE individuals who commit various offences that do not meet all the criteria for terrorism"

¹¹⁵ Prosecutors in the Netherlands are similarly using "discrimination" charges as appropriate. Another example took place in Malta, where a February 2019 drive-by shooting at a refugee camp was prosecuted as a "racial hate crime." See Cilia, R. *Updated: Soldiers charged with drive-by shooting of migrant in Hal Far plead not guilty*, The Independent (Malta), 20 Mar 2021. <https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-05-19/local-news/Soldiers-to-be-arraigned-in-connection-with-drive-by-shooting-of-migrant-in-Birzebbuga-6736208347>

¹¹⁶ European Parliament, *Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online content regulation approaches*, July 2020. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655135/IPOL_STU\(2020\)655135_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655135/IPOL_STU(2020)655135_EN.pdf)

E. Prison Rehabilitation and Post-Release Monitoring

Prisoner Monitoring and De-Radicalisation Programmes

24. Devote the appropriate level of resources to monitor REMVE offenders' in-prison activity, including potential recruitment activities or active escape or attack planning, that corresponds with the terrorist, rather than "ordinary" criminal, nature of their offences.

25. Institute in-prison de-radicalisation programmes for REMVE offenders that leverage existing tools, designed and based on different forms of violent extremism, while adapting them to account for REMVE's particular ideology and dynamics.

26. Educate prison staff on the features unique to REMVE and the significant level of threat it may pose, and train them to identify indicators of radicalisation to violence and respond appropriately.

Corrections officials and other criminal justice practitioners countering violent jihadism and other types of terrorist threats have developed some expertise in monitoring terrorist offenders in prison for signs of continued violent extremism, potential recruitment activities, or active escape or attack planning. While such practices are relevant to REMVE prisoners, adapting and effectively applying them currently remains a gap in many countries' approach. This is partly the case because REMVE offenders are often convicted of non-terrorism-related offences. Within the United States, for instance, the FBI treats members of extreme right-wing prison gangs like the Aryan Brotherhood as "common" criminals, rather than as terrorist group members. As a result, the FBI's Criminal Division is normally responsible for monitoring such individuals, rather than a dedicated entity with expertise specific to terrorism.

"Training prison staff to identify indicators of REMVE radicalisation can be an important factor in effectively designing in-prison monitoring and de-radicalisation programmes"

A number of countries do have in-prison de-radicalisation programmes for REMVE offenders. In Germany, for instance, there are a range of de-radicalisation, as well as counter-radicalisation, programmes working with extreme right-wing prisoners. These efforts involve collaboration between state actors and civil society organisations, notably the Violence Prevention Network.¹¹⁷ Serbia is currently implementing a European Union-funded project focusing on radicalisation in prisons, in which the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior both play a role. In 2016, as part of its CONTEST Strategy's PREVENT strand, the United Kingdom introduced a Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), designed to support individuals on probation licence following conviction for a TACT related offence.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ See Violence Prevention Network, 'Deradicalisation in Prison', Undated. <https://violence-prevention-network.de/angebote/trainings-in-haft/?lang=en>

¹¹⁸ Other efforts either in place or currently being developed in the United Kingdom include dedicated Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Prison Prevent Leads (PPLs), specialist theological intervention by training imams, separate from the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), the establishment of Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service's Joint Extremism Unit (JEXU), and community pathfinder and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA).

The DDP offers a range of individually tailored interventions and support measures, including mentoring by various Intervention Providers (IPs). Its ultimate aim is providing individuals with the means to desist from violent extremist beliefs and actions and to disengage from terrorism before they re-join society. This programme was later expanded to include individuals subject to Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures (TPIMs), as well as those who had returned from conflict zones and were subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). In December 2018, further expansion included in-prison interventions for those convicted of TACT offences or exhibiting extremist behaviour. In general, a multi-agency rehabilitation approach, involving trust-building and open communication, has proven valuable in a number of countries, including Belgium and Denmark in addition to Germany and the United Kingdom. Professional psychologists can play an important role in such an approach, and incorporating effective monitoring and evaluation tools into the design and implementation of de-radicalisation programmes is also essential.

Training prison staff to identify indicators of REMVE radicalisation can be another important factor in effectively designing such programmes. In the United Kingdom, considerable efforts are already in place or currently being developed, notably the delivery of an in-house Awareness for Staff on Prevent Extremism and the Counter Terrorism Strategy (ASPECTS) training course to all front-line prison staff. Australia is currently evaluating the utility of conducting Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training for prison staff, to help them recognise and understand individual behaviours and better communicate with individuals vulnerable to REMVE. Estonia has similarly introduced a risk assessment tool in prisons, with additional training provided to help case officers and other prison staff detect radicalisation to violence and respond preventively.

Post-Release Rehabilitation and Reintegration and Monitoring

27. Conduct pre-release risk assessments of REMVE offenders, and institute effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

Effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes can prevent future REMVE activity. In light of similarities in risk factors and radicalisation processes across different forms of violent extremism, programmes for REMVE offenders can leverage existing programmes used to rehabilitate and reintegrate other types of terrorism offenders. A vital precondition for such programmes is pre-release risk assessment, which may be based on tools used outside the custodial context to better assess what phase of the radicalisation process an individual may have reached. Many countries, however, lack processes for conducting pre-release risk assessments of terrorism offenders generally, let alone risk assessment tools adapted to reflect features peculiar to REMVE ideology and dynamics.

28. Institute post-release monitoring and other administrative post-custodial tools as appropriate, in accordance with domestic and international law, including human rights law.

Some countries have instituted programmes which can be used to monitor REMVE offenders after their release.¹¹⁹ In Australia, for example, individuals convicted of terrorism offences can be subject to the High-Risk Terrorism Offender Scheme (HRTTO), which assesses individual risk of recidivism. In cases considered to remain high-risk, the government may sometimes use post-custodial tools, including Control Orders (COs), Continuing Detention Orders (CDOs), and recently proposed Extended Supervision Orders (ESOs), introduced to Parliament as an additional post-release monitoring tool. COs generally monitor behaviour post-release, and ESOs impose more active continued surveillance. CDOs extend a sentence for up to three years, allowing for continuing detention of eligible convicted terrorist offenders who pose an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if released into the community. CDOs are intended to apply to the highest-risk category of convicted terrorist offenders, with eligible terrorist offenders assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Victorian Supreme Court granted the first CDO in Australia on 24 December 2020, in relation to Mr. Benbrika, who had been convicted in 2005 for his role in preparing to conduct a terrorist attack on historic landmarks in Australia. The legal threshold for application of this final measure is very high and rarely met, however, and in many jurisdictions such measures may not be available at all.

Beyond the legal challenges which post-release monitoring or more serious measures may present, there are often practical difficulties involved as well. Post-release approaches may be more difficult to implement if the responsibility for doing so falls to local police in far-flung areas who may have little or no awareness or expertise related to this threat. Coordination between various government agencies may be required. In Australia, for example, while jihadist extremists are primarily concentrated in two main cities, REMVE actors are widely dispersed, including in rural areas. The JCTT model allows Federal and State Police and intelligence agencies to work collaboratively at a national level to manage the challenges of post-release monitoring. Generally speaking, however, post-release monitoring is a gap in many countries' approach to terrorist threats of all types, including REMVE.

¹¹⁹ There has been discussion in the Netherlands of expanding the role of the multi-disciplinary "Regional Safety Houses," currently used to help deal with vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation, to cover post-release monitoring of some offenders as well. More generally, Supervised Release can be a valuable tool in U.S. federal cases.

F. Community Engagement and Public Outreach

Information Sharing to Improve Preparedness

29. Establish routine and incident-specific information sharing between law enforcement and the public (including the private sector) on REMVE trends, threats, and tactics, to include information on risk assessment, suspicious behaviour reporting, insider threats, and other security awareness and preparedness topics.

While much attention is rightly focused on having designated and capable security forces to respond to, and criminal justice institutions to investigate REMVE attacks, that is only part of a comprehensive approach to this challenge. Community engagement and public outreach of several kinds are also essential both to countering REMVE and to preventing such threats from arising in the first place.

Improving preparedness for such attacks requires varied capabilities and close partnerships between governments and industry. Countries may have different “duty to warn” processes, but regular law enforcement outreach and engagement with the public and the private sector on trends, threats, and tactics, as well as on crisis response, can help to disrupt plots and/or reduce the casualties or damage from a successful attack. In the United States, for example, publicly available resources specifically geared towards faith-based organisations and houses of worship include a Guide and Self-Assessment Tool, which provide building blocks for effective safety and security programmes.

The resources include assessment, training, planning, exercises, and other materials focused on a wide range of man-made threats (e.g., bombing, active shooter, vehicle ramming, etc.) that could be used against the faith-based community.

The challenges inherent in attempting to disrupt a lone actor’s plot can potentially also be partially mitigated by ensuring the public and the private sector are aware of how to report suspicious behaviour, reduce insider threat, and prepare for and protect themselves in the event of an attack. It is therefore critical that governments and local law enforcement establish partnerships with industry owners and operators to promote situational awareness, joint planning, training, and two-way communication and information sharing on the on threats to public spaces (soft targets) and infrastructure.¹²⁰ At the same time, information from the public and the private sector can be integrated into official analytical products to improve risk assessments and situational understanding.

“Some challenges in attempting to disrupt a lone actor's plot can potentially be partially mitigated by ensuring the public and the private sector are aware of how to report suspicious behaviour, reduce insider threat, and prepare for and protect themselves in the event of an attack”

¹²⁰ See also United Nations Security Council Resolution 2341, adopted on 13 February 2017, available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/038/57/PDF/N1703857.pdf?OpenElement>. See also the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) *Antalya Memorandum on Good Practices on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context*, September 2017, available at <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents>,

Referrals of Vulnerable Individuals

30. Put mechanisms in place allowing civil society professionals or other community actors to refer individuals undergoing or at risk of REMVE radicalisation to government agencies for proactive action by the appropriate public health, social services, and law enforcement entities.

31. Establish multi-disciplinary case management teams when appropriate, equipped with tools to assess individuals' levels of risk and tailor intervention strategies, involving not only criminal justice practitioners but also psychologists and mental health professionals, child protection or youth care specialists, social services, and school staff, depending on the circumstances.

Moreover, terrorist networks of all types, including extreme right-wing and REMVE groups, have traditionally exploited communities for their own advantages. This has included using them as a source of recruitment, to provide funding, for concealment, and as a means of gaining local intelligence. Part of the problem has always been identifying terrorist actors embedded in local communities and then mitigating or neutralising their threat while minimising any collateral impact on the wider community. This is the same for REMVE as for other any other type of terrorist threat.

Bearing this in mind, community actors are often best positioned to identify the early signs that an individual is undergoing or at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism. They may also feel invested in those individuals' well-being, and motivated to intervene productively — but can only do so if they know what warning signs to look for and what actions to take if those signs appear. Criminal justice practitioners can work to equip community actors with the knowledge they need to take early and effective preventive action. Multi-agency de-radicalisation programmes, along with family counselling and broader community support, can be effective in such situations.

A prominent example are the multi-disciplinary case management teams, or “Regional Safety Houses”, the Netherlands has introduced to help deal with vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation and involvement with violent extremist groups. Criminal justice practitioners partner with local actors through these teams, intervening directly with individuals who are vulnerable or already radicalised, while also providing support to their families or others close to them.¹²¹

The United Kingdom has worked with community actors through its PREVENT strategy, part of the wider national CONTEST Strategy, to intervene preventively with vulnerable individuals. Police cannot solve all safeguarding of those vulnerable to radicalisation to violence, and PREVENT works — with communities, the private sector and the wider stakeholder group — to provide a response in the community to vulnerable

¹²¹ Community members and professionals, such as family members, teachers, social workers, or even local sports club members, may choose to initiate this process by sharing troubling information about potential radicalisation or extremist behaviour with the authorities. Local officials then consult with police and prosecutors, conduct a multi-disciplinary assessment of that individual's level of risk, and fashion an individualised intervention strategy. Those strategies combine preventive and repressive security and social integration measures, which may involve not only criminal justice practitioners but also psychologists and mental health professionals, child protection or youth care specialists, social services, and school staff, depending on the circumstances. See OHCHR, *Contribution by the Kingdom of the Netherlands*, Undated, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/SR/GA75/Netherlands-GA75CT.pdf>

or radicalised individuals or those who might radicalise others.¹²² Between 2015 and 2020, the proportion of referrals to PREVENT related to REMVE rose from 10% to around 24%.

Norway similarly has taken a multi-agency preventive approach, with roles for nine different government ministries, including the Ministries of Education, Health, and Justice, through the 2014 Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, currently being updated.¹²³ Norwegian school staff are educated to identify warning signs of radicalisation to violence and refer at-risk individuals to social services when appropriate.

In Sweden, civil society professionals engage with vulnerable individuals, including REMVE actors, through the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism (*Centre mot Valdbejakande Extremism-CVE*).¹²⁴ This organisation runs a support line where it is possible to anonymously report concerns that a loved one is vulnerable to violent extremism, as well as a support line for professionals, such as teachers and social workers, seeking advice on how to address radicalisation.

New Zealand police also work at the community level, engaging directly with vulnerable individuals to reduce the risk of their involvement in radicalisation to violence, often through a multi-agency Young Persons Intervention Programme, aimed at diverting those between the ages of 14 to 20 away from violence. Since the 2019 Christchurch attacks, a national prevention coordinator has been appointed to lead a new Multi-Agency Coordination and Intervention Programme, which will adapt the Young Persons Intervention Programme approach for vulnerable adults.¹²⁵

In addition to prevention and counter-narrative programmes at the local and national levels, there are also supra-national programmes, which include the European Union Cities against Radicalisation programme and the EXIT work of the European Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).¹²⁶ One technique some of these programmes use is a "Tandem Team," in which a pair of professional experts counsel a vulnerable individual, attempting to build trust, mentor, and provide them with different perspectives and life skills.

¹²² Concerned community members such as teachers, social workers, or family members may submit individual referrals to state authorities. When appropriate, officials will refer those cases to PREVENT's Channel Programme and coordinate multi-agency responses, intervening directly, along with private sector professionals, to engage with those individuals, assign them suitable Intervention Providers (IPs), and attempt to mitigate and counter the radicalisation process. See UK Gov. 'Prevent Strategy', CM 8092, HM Government, June 2011. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf. PREVENT also runs youth and community projects tailored to local communities, and projects such as REKINDLER, which supports vulnerable individuals in conjunction with various charities and social bodies, such as First Steps, Cradle to Career, and Autism Together. See First Steps website: <https://firststepsed.co.uk/>; Cradle to Career website: <https://c2cmn.com/>; Autism Together website: <https://www.autismtogether.co.uk/>.

¹²³ Norwegian Gov, 'Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism', Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2014. <https://rm.coe.int/action-plan-norway-nov-2016/16806bdb50>

¹²⁴ Centre mot Valdbejakande Extremism-CVE website: <https://www.cve.se/>

¹²⁵ New Zealand Government Royal Commission (2020) *Op. Cit.*

¹²⁶ EU, 'EU Cities against Radicalisation', European Union 26 Feb 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agency-da-security/201902_a-europe-that-protects-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf. EU, EXIT Working Group (RAN EXIT) website: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/topics-and-working-groups/ran-exit_en. See also EU 'Exit strategies', EU Migration and Home Affairs website: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-exit-strategies_en. RAN has conducted significant work in this field and has produced a collection of best practices. See EU RAN, 'Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism', Radicalisation Awareness Network 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf.

Improving Public Awareness

32. Devote significant resources to improving public awareness of the features unique to REMVE and the significant level of threat it may pose, through online as well as off-line programmes, while also publicising relevant tools and approaches developed to combat the range of terrorist threats. Such efforts should equip community members to help identify and counter radicalisation and recruitment at the local level, while communicating clear moral condemnation of racially or ethnically motivated violence.

Beyond structured referral and intervention mechanisms, improving public awareness of REMVE more broadly is important for multiple reasons. This type of violent extremism's danger to societies has been overlooked until recently, with greater focus devoted to other types of terrorist or general security threats. Educating the public about the nature of REMVE can make them more security-conscious, while also sending a moral message about the kinds of beliefs and behaviour that countries consider immoral and contrary to their values.

Raised public awareness of the REMVE threat is also critical to identifying and countering REMVE radicalisation and recruitment at the community level. If members of the public recognise the indicators of radicalisation to violence, they will be more likely to intervene preventively. Broader societal messaging about the danger of REMVE can thus complement more focused work with particular community professionals.

In the United States, criminal justice practitioners have begun using a proactive communications strategy to inform the public about domestic terrorism threats, including REMVE, as part of the "See Something, Say Something" approach.¹²⁷ The U.K. police use an overall systems-based approach, Communities Defeat Terrorism, attempting to educate the public about the full range of ideological threats through media campaigns such as Action Counters Terrorism (ACT).¹²⁸

Other countries have also produced educational material and publications to improve both public and police awareness of radicalisation indicators and appropriate steps in response. Estonia has produced a pamphlet to help local municipality, school, and community workers with the early detection of radicalisation and preventive responses, with an internal version for the police and an external pamphlet which seeks to provide the correct information about radicalisation to civilian counterparts and stakeholders. Likewise, Serbia is currently working with the OSCE to develop material to assist practitioners involved in counter-radicalisation, as well as a handbook to improve police cooperation with communities.

Community actors can also play a direct role in such public awareness raising and education, whether independently or in collaboration with the authorities. Former violent extremists, or individuals who were

"Educating the public about the nature of REMVE can make them more security-conscious, while also sending a moral message about the kinds of beliefs and behaviour that countries consider immoral and contrary to their values"

¹²⁷ US DHS, 'If you See something, Say something', Department of Homeland Security, Undated. <https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something>

¹²⁸ NPCC, 'Communities Defeat Terrorism', National Police Chief's Council, undated: <https://www.npcc.police.uk/NationalPolicing/CounterTerrorism/Communitiesdefeatterrorism.aspx>. UK Gov, 'ACT - Action Counters Terrorism', Counter Terrorism Policing, Undated. <https://act.campaign.gov.uk/>

once active REMVE actors but have de-radicalised, may be particularly effective at communicating with at-risk audiences.¹²⁹

Government engagement with media organisations can serve several functions in this context. The development of national and international “fact checking” tools can help counter conspiracy theories and disinformation spread online. Strategic communications and alternative or counter-narratives are other potentially useful tools. Engagement with the media can also involve the promotion of best practices for how media outlets can appropriately cover REMVE attacks or other activity without amplifying violent extremist narratives or increasing security risk.

Finally, it is worth noting that appropriate criminal justice action against REMVE actors — including effective and lawful prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing, as well as proscription or other sanctions of groups — communicates moral condemnation of racially or ethnically motivated violence, and thus has a public educational function of its own.

¹²⁹ One example is Christian Picciolini, formerly the leader of a neo-Nazi skinhead group in the U.S., who since de-radicalising has become an activist, running an NGO which conducts outreach to communities vulnerable to radicalisation, and advocating for intervention, prevention, and disengagement. See Christian Picciolini, “Meeting the Challenge of White Nationalist Terrorism at Home and Abroad,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Committee on Homeland Security, September 18, 2019. <https://homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Picciolini%20-%20Testimony%20REVISED.pdf>.

Appendix: Examples of REMVE Attacks

Bombings

Oklahoma City Bombing (United States, 1995): On 19 April 1995, a large truck bomb was detonated outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and wounding at least 680 others. This was the deadliest terrorist attack against the United States prior to the 9/11 attacks of 2001, and remains the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in the country's history. The main perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh, an Army veteran with links to the Militia Movement, had extreme anti-government views and was seeking to target several federal agencies' offices. McVeigh was sentenced to death and executed in 2001.¹³⁰

London Nail Bombings (United Kingdom, 1999): During successive weekends in April 1999, a total of three IED "nail bombs" were detonated to target minority communities in London, killing three people and injuring well over 100. The bomber, David Copeland, a 22-year-old Neo-Nazi extremist who appeared to have worked alone, was seeking to start a race war in England. He was convicted of murder and causing explosions, and received six life sentences with a mandatory minimum of 50 years.¹³¹

Gothenburg Bombings (Sweden, 2016 – 2017): Between 2016 and 2017, two bombings and one attempted bombing in the western Swedish city of Gothenburg targeted two refugee centres and a left-wing café, seriously injuring an immigration officer. The bombers were three men with ties to the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), two of whom had allegedly participated in paramilitary training in Russia. All three were convicted of actual or attempted devastation endangering the public, and received sentences of up to eight and a half years' imprisonment.¹³²

Vehicle Attacks

Finsbury Park Vehicle Attack (United Kingdom, 2017): On 19 June 2017, during Ramadan, an attacker driving a white hired van deliberately rammed a group of Muslim worshippers near Finsbury Park Mosque, London, following their night-time prayers. Twelve were injured, and one man subsequently died. The attacker, Darren Osborne, who had radicalised quite rapidly and voiced extremist anti-Muslim views in the weeks prior to the attack, was convicted and received concurrent life sentences for terrorism-related murder and attempted murder, with a minimum of 43 years.¹³³

¹³⁰ FBI, 'Oklahoma City Bombing', FBI Website. <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing>

¹³¹ Lee, S. 'London Nail Bombings remembered 20 years on', BBC News 30 Apr 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-47216594>

¹³² The Local Sweden, 'Two men charged over refugee home blast received military training in Russia', 9 Jun 2017. <https://www.thelocal.se/20170609/gothenburg-sweden-two-men-charged-over-refugee-home-bomb-attack-received-military-training-in-russia>

¹³³ Rawlinson, K, 'Daren Osborne jailed for life for Finsbury Park terrorist attack', The Guardian 2 Feb 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/02/finsbury-park-attack-darren-osborne-jailed>

Mass Shootings

Charleston Church Shootings (United States, 2015): On 17 June 2015, a lone attacker shot and killed nine Black worshippers during an evening Bible study at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The church's congregation was allegedly targeted because of its historical association with the anti-slavery and civil rights movements, and the attack coincided with the anniversary of a planned slave uprising in 1822. The attacker, Dylan Roof, a white supremacist who had posted a manifesto online expressing and endorsing race hate, was convicted of 33 counts of federal hate crimes and firearms charges, and sentenced to death, as well as life without parole; his death sentence is currently under appeal.¹³⁴

Quebec City Mosque Shooting (Canada, 2017): On 29 January 2017, a lone gunman entered the Islamic Cultural Centre of Sainte-Foy, Quebec, during evening prayers and opened fire, killing six people and wounding 19.¹³⁵ The attacker, Alexandre Bissonnette, known to have white nationalist and anti-Islamic views, was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 25 years.¹³⁶

Pittsburgh Synagogue Attack (United States, 2018): On 27 October 2018, a lone gunman attacked the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, during a Shabbat morning service, killing eleven worshippers and wounding six in the deadliest attack against the Jewish community in the United States.¹³⁷ The gunman, Robert Bowers, awaits trial on dozens of charges, including hate crimes, obstructing religious beliefs, and discharging a firearm during crimes of violence.¹³⁸

Christchurch Mosque Attacks (New Zealand, 2019): On 15 March 2019 a lone REMVE attacker launched two linked firearms attacks against mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, during Friday prayers, killing 51 in total and injuring a further 40,¹³⁹ while live-streaming some of the shootings.¹⁴⁰ Prior to the attacks, the gunman, Brenton Tarrant, had covered his weapons with white supremacist symbols¹⁴¹ and posted online a manifesto he entitled, "The Great Replacement."¹⁴² He eventually pleaded guilty to multiple murders, attempted murders, and terrorism offences, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, the first such whole life term issued in New Zealand.¹⁴³

El Paso Walmart Shooting (United States, 2019): On 3 August 2019, at a Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, a lone gunman shot and killed 23, injuring a further 23 people. The attacker, Patrick Crusius, deliberately targeted Hispanic Americans in what was the deadliest attack against this community in modern U.S. history.¹⁴⁴ Investigation linked him to a manifesto posted online before the attack which claimed inspiration from the Christchurch Mosque shootings earlier in the year, expressed anti-Hispanic sentiments, and promoted the "Great Replacement" conspiracy theory.¹⁴⁵ Crusius awaits trial on 90 federal charges, including hate crimes leading to death and using a firearm to commit murder.

¹³⁴ History, 'Charleston Church Shooting', 8 June 20. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/charleston-ame-church-shooting>

¹³⁵ Kassam, A. & Lartey, J. 'Quebec City mosque shooting: Six dead as Trudeau condemns terrorist attack', The Guardian 30 Jan 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/30/quebec-mosque-shooting-canada-deaths>

¹³⁶ National Post, 'Why no terrorism charges in Quebec mosque shooting? It would place extra burden on prosecutors: experts', 1 Feb 2017. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/quebec-mosque-shooting-terrorism-offences-are-complex-experts-say>

¹³⁷ Tuohy, D. 'Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Called Domestic Terrorism', 29 Oct 2018. <https://www.nhpr.org/post/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-called-domestic-terrorism#stream/0>

¹³⁸ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 'Judge sets new deadlines for defence in trial of accused Tree of Life shooter', 26 May 2020. <https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2020/05/26/Judge-sets-new-deadlines-defense-team-trial-accused-shooter-Robert-Bowers-Tree-of-Life/stories/202005260104>

¹³⁹ BBC News, 'Christchurch shooting: Gunman Tarrant wanted to kill as many as possible', 24 Aug 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53861456>

¹⁴⁰ New Zealand Gov. 'Christchurch Mosque Attack Livestream', New Zealand Classification Office, Undated. <https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/featured-classification-decisions/christchurch-mosque-attack-livestream/>

¹⁴¹ Sherwood, H. & Parveen, N. 'Christchurch Attack: Suspect had white supremacist symbols on weapons', The Guardian 15 Mar 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/15/christchurch-shooting-new-zealand-suspect-white-supremacist-symbols-weapons>

¹⁴² Stocker, P. 'The Great Replacement Theory: A historical perspective', Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right CARR, 19 Sep 2019. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/great-replacement-theory-historical-perspective/>

¹⁴³ BBC News, 'Christchurch Mosque attack: Brenton Tarrant sentenced to life without parole', 27 Aug 2020: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53919624>

¹⁴⁴ Macklin, G. 'The El Paso Terrorist Attack', in CTC Sentinel Dec 2019, Vol. 12. Issue 11. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CTC-SENTINEL-112019.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ Todd, B, Maxouris, C, and Vera A, 'The El Paso shooting suspect showed no remorse, or regret, police say', CNN 6 Aug 2019. <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/05/us/el-paso-suspect-patrick-crusius/index.html>

Halle Synagogue Shootings (Germany, 2019): On 9 October 2019, during the festival of *Yom Kippur*, a lone attacker committed several shootings after failing to gain entry to a synagogue in Halle, killing two people and wounding two more, while livestreaming part of the attack to a gaming website.¹⁴⁶ Investigation revealed that the attacker, Stephen Balliet, had posted online an anti-Semitic manifesto online prior to the attack.¹⁴⁷ Balliet has since been convicted for murder, among other charges, and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁴⁸

Hanau Shisha Bar Shootings (Germany, 2020): On 19 February 2020, a lone gunman attacked two shisha bars in Hanau, near Frankfurt, targeting members of the Turkish community, killing nine people and wounding five before shooting and killing his mother and then himself.¹⁴⁹ The attacker, Tobias Rathjen, was an extreme right-winger who had previously posted a manifesto and videos online expressing hatred for migrants.¹⁵⁰

Targeted Shootings

NSU Serial Killings (Germany, 2000 – 2007): Between 2000 and 2007, a German Neo-Nazi terrorist group known as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) committed a series of assassinations, claiming ten victims, predominantly from the Turkish minority but including a Greek and a German policewoman. The group was also believed to be involved in a 2004 nail bomb attack on a Turkish immigrant area of Cologne, which wounded 22 people.¹⁵¹ Two NSU members killed themselves to avoid capture, while a third, Beate Zschäpe, was eventually tried and convicted on ten counts of murder, among other charges including membership in, and foundation of, a terrorist organisation, and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁵²

Malmö Shootings (Sweden, 2009 – 2010): Between 2009 and 2010, a lone attacker engaged in a series of shootings in the southern Swedish city of Malmö, killing two and injuring thirteen, while deliberately targeting people who appeared to belong to minority communities.¹⁵³ Once identified and arrested, the attacker, Peter Mangs, was convicted of two murders and eight attempted murders, and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁵⁴

Murder of Jo Cox MP (United Kingdom, 2016): On 11 June 2016, a lone attacker murdered Labour Party Member of Parliament (MP) Jo Cox in Yorkshire, shooting her several times before stabbing her repeatedly, and wounding one other person in the process. This was the first murder of a serving MP since 1990. The attacker was arrested near the scene. Thomas Mair, who had links to the extreme right-wing National Front (NF) political party and Islamophobic and neo-Nazi organisations, apparently targeted Cox for her political views. He was convicted of murder, among other charges, and received a life sentence without possibility of parole.¹⁵⁵

Murder of Walter Lübcke (Germany, 2019): On 2 June 2019, an attacker in Isthia shot German local politician Walter Lübcke, who had been subjected to hostility on the internet, in particular as a result of his advocacy for refugees in 2015. The attacker, Stephan Ernst, had intensive contacts with neo-Nazi groups in his past. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁶ Koehler, D. *The Halle, Germany, Synagogue Attack and the Evolution of the Far-Right Terror Threat*, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point. December 2019. <https://ctc.usma.edu/halle-germany-synagogue-attack-evolution-far-right-terror-threat/>

¹⁴⁷ SPLC, *Atomwaffen Division*, Undated, Southern Poverty Law Centre. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/atomwaffen-division>

¹⁴⁸ BBC News, *Halle Synagogue attack: Germany far-right gunman jailed for life*, 21 Dec 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55395682>

¹⁴⁹ Rahn, L. & Carter, L. *Hanau Shootings: What we know about the victims*, DW 21 Feb 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/hanau-shootings-what-we-know-about-the-victims/a-52460950>

¹⁵⁰ BBC News, *Germany Shooting: What we know about the Hanau attack*, 20 Feb 2020: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51571649>

¹⁵¹ Bernstein, R. *Nail Bomb in a Turkish Area in Cologne Hurts 17*, 10 Jun 2004. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/10/world/nail-bomb-in-a-turkish-area-in-cologne-hurts-17.html>

¹⁵² Saha, M., *NSU: What you need to know about Germany's neo-Nazi terror group*, DW 5 Aug 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/nsu-germany/a-39777036>

¹⁵³ Gardell, M. *Urban Terror: The Case of Lone Wolf Peter Mangs*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 30, Issue 5, 2018. *Terrorism in Nordic Countries*. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2018.1444796>

¹⁵⁴ BBC News, *Peter Mangs pleads not guilty over racist Malmo attacks*, 14 May 2012. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18059955>

¹⁵⁵ Cobain, I. *Jo Cox killed in brutal, cowardly and politically motivated murder, trial hears*, *The Guardian* 14 Nov 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/14/jo-cox-killed-in-politically-motivated-murder-trial-thomas-mair-hears>

¹⁵⁶ Euronews, *Walter Lübcke: Right wing extremist Stephan Ernst handed life sentence for murder of pro-migrant MP*, 29 Jan 2021. <https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/28/verdict-expected-in-trial-of-neo-nazi-accused-of-murdering-german-politician>

Multi-Weapon Attacks

Halálbrigád Murders, (Hungary, 2008 – 2009): Between 2008 to 2009, a so-called “Death Squad” (*Halálbrigád*) conducted ten attacks across eastern Hungary, primarily targeting Romani families’ houses using petrol bombs and firearms, which killed six and injured 55 people. The attackers, four right-wing extremists previously involved in the skinhead movement as well as football hooliganism, were eventually detained and tried; three received life sentences, and the fourth received 13 years imprisonment, all without possibility of parole.¹⁵⁷

Oslo and Utøya Island Attacks (Norway, 2011): On 22 July 2011, a REMVE attacker carried out both a van bomb explosion in Oslo, Norway, and a mass shooting on nearby Utøya island hours later, killing 77 people in total and wounding hundreds more in what remains one of the deadliest REMVE attacks any country has suffered.¹⁵⁸ The attacker, Anders Behring Breivik, had targeted the office block housing Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg in Oslo with an ANFO-based Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)¹⁵⁹ and a summer camp held by the governing Labour Party’s youth division on Utøya. Prior to the attacks, Breivik had electronically released a manifesto espousing extremist views including the need to defend “Christian Europe.”¹⁶⁰ He was tried and convicted for acts of terrorism and received the maximum possible sentence under Norwegian law, a 21-year prison term which can be extended indefinitely as long as he is considered a threat to society.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Mares, M. ‘Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Hungary at the Beginning of the 21st Century’, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 12, Issue 6. Leiden University. <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/a8-mares.pdf>

¹⁵⁸ Seierstad, A. (2015) *One of Us: The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in Norway*. London: Virago.

¹⁵⁹ Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO), a homemade ‘shifting’ explosive, regularly fabricated by terrorists for explosives attacks.

¹⁶⁰ Bromssen, K, von, ‘2083 – A European Declaration of Independence’ - *An Analysis of Discourses from the Extreme*, *Nordidactica – Journal of Humanities and Social Science Education* 2013, (1). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279868578_2083_-_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence_An_Analysis_of_Discourses_from_the_Extreme/link/559cebb608ae70ed9689df3e/download

¹⁶¹ Hemmingby, C. & Bjorgo, T. ‘Terrorist Target Selection: The case of Anders Behring Breivik’, *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol. 12, Issue 6. Dec 2018. Leiden University. <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/a11-hemmingby-bjorgo.pdf>



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